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ABSTRACT 
The Relationship Between Marcia's Ego Identity Status Paradigm 
and Erikson's Psychosocial Theory 
by 
Lawrence Anderson. Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University. 1993 
Major Professor: Randall M. Jones 
Department: Family and Human Development 
While Erikson's psychosocial theory continues to dominate 
theoretical explanations of adolescent identity development. Marcia's 
ego identity status paradigm has become the primary basis to 
empirically measure such notions . Though Marcia's paradigm has its 
roots in psychosocial theory. questions have surfaced regarding the 
communality of Marcia's and Erikson's notions on identity. Issues of 
scope. connectedness. definition. terminology. and measurement have 
vi 
marked a potential divergence among the two approaches-views which 
until recently seemed almost unified. This study addressed the 
relationship between Erikson's psychosocial theory and Marcia's ego 
identity status paradigm. By administering identity and psychosocial 
stage-specific measures to a sample of college-age adolescents. an 
assessment of the empirical relationship between the two theories has 
been established. 
vii 
A general pattem was found that the highest levels of psycho-
social trust. autonomy. initiative. and industry were reported by the 
achieved respondents, followed by the foreclosed, moratorium, and 
diffused respondents, respectively. Discriminant analysis also identified 
specific psychosocial differences between statuses. The achieved 
respondents reported higher levels of trust. autonomy, initiative. and 
industry than moratoriums: significantly higher levels of autonomy and 
industry than the foreclosed: and significantly higher levels of trust and 
initiative. and significantly lower levels of guilt when compared to 
diffused respondents . Moratoriums reported significantly higher levels 
of emotional autonomy and significantly lower levels of trust and 
initiative than foreclosed respondents . Moratoriums did report 
significantly higher initiative and lower guilt than the diffused. 
Foreclosed respondents reported significantly higher initiative and 
lower autonomy than diffused persons. These results provide 
significant-albeit initial----quantitative evidence that Marcia's ego 
identity status paradigm corresponds both specifically and broadly to 
Erikson's theory of identity development. 
(144 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on psychosocial development increased dramatically 
during the 1980s. As a basis to explain both normal and psycho-
pathological development. psychosocial theory is growing in scope and 
utility. Achenbach (1988) suggested that Erikson's theory, in 
particular, can provide a basis to assess human development and 
associated problems in adolescents. 
The most researched area of Erikson's theory to date has been 
adolescent identity development-the fifth of Erikson's eight psycho-
social stages. Few studies. however, have empirically investigated how 
the four preceding stages of trust. autonomy. initiative. and industry 
relate to identity development. Much of that void can be attributed to 
the dearth of efficacious. reliable, and empirically valid constructs 
addressing Erikson's theory. The most widely employed psychosocial 
instrument of the 1970s, 1980s. and early 1990s-James Marcia's 
(1966) identity statu s interview-focuses solely on Erikson's fifth stage. 
Much empirically based research-over 200 studies (American 
Psychological Association. 1992)-has stemmed from Marcia's identity 
status model. Recently, however, Cote and Levine (1988a) have 
challenged the "assumption that ego identity status is an appropriate 
conceptualization and operationalization of Erikson's theory" (p. 147) . 
The objective of this study was to empirically assess the relationship 
between Marcia's ego identity status paradigm and Erikson's 
psychosocial theory. 
Erikson's Psychosocial Theory 
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Erikson's (1959, 1963. 1968, 1982) theory has presented an 
innovative perspective of developmental issues as they function across 
the life-cycle. His psychosocial perspective seeks to integrate the 
interactive influences of the psyche with biological predispositions and 
social experience. Erikson furthered the notion of epigenetic themes-
or the idea that "all growth and development follow analogous 
patterns" (Erikson, 1982. p . 27) . Erikson 's portrayal of universal life-
stages serves to elucidate human development in a comprehensive, yet 
parsimonious and easily understood way. 
Erikson's (1963) eight ages of man address common crises 
faced by individuals from birth to death . The first five stages (trust, 
autonomy, initiative, industry, and identity) directly correspond to 
Freudian early-life phases . With the addition of three adult relevant 
stages (viz .. intimacy. generativity, and integrity) Erikson moved 
beyond Freud's emphasis upon infancy and childhood, and 
acknowledged development in adulthood. 
Many theoreticians (e.g., Mathes, 1981) have suggested that 
Erikson's theory affords the greatest promise to empirically study 
human development across the lifespan. Vaillant and Leff (1980) have 
argued that Erikson's theory is the only formal model to adequately 
describe adult development. 
Marcia's Ego Identity Status Paradigm 
3 
Corresponding with Erikson's fifth stage of psychosocial 
development. Marcia developed a means to measure adolescent 
identity development (Marcia, 1966). In an attempt to explicate the 
essence, function , and dimension of identity, Marcia modified specific 
Eriksonian terms to operationalize identity formation. The terms 
foreclosure, identity diffusion, moratorium. and identity achievement 
became Marcia's identity statuses. Broadly defined, identity status 
represents the present state of a person's identity vis-a-vis past crisis 
(exploration) and present commitments . 
Marcia's model has the research advantage of addressing highly 
circumscribed variables. Not only does the model focus on a single 
stage of psychosocial development, the identity stage, it deals with 
only two of Erikson's several notions on ego identity-exploration and 
commitment. With such regulated scope, the measurement of identity 
has been simplified. In spite of its simplicity, Marcia 's identity status 
paradigm has proven robus t. if not remarkable, in correlating with 
numerous adolescent behaviors, attitudes, and tendencies. Many 
researchers are satisfied that the ego identity status model is an 
adequate assessment of identity development. However. a few have 
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argued that Marcia's paradigm distorts and trivializes Erikson's notion 
of identity and that it has severed ties from its psychosocial parent 
(Cote & Levine. 1988a). 
With the development of broader measures of Erikson's theory, 
such as the Eriksonian Psychosocial Stage Inventory (Rosenthal, 
Gurney. & Moore. 1981). researchers have a means to examine 
Marcia's model within the context of Erikson's stage theory. This study 
addressed the relationship between Marcia's identity status model and 
Erikson's theory by assessing the empirical relationship between 
several related. concept- and theory-based measures. 
Rationale for study 
Although Erikson 's theoretical notions are growing in 
acceptance. popularity. and utility. the comprehensive nature of Ws 
theory-addressing the interactive psychological. social. biological. 
cultural. and historical aspects of human development from birth to 
death-covers vast areas of uncertainty and variance. Differing 
interpretations of the functions and interconnectedness of such broad 
human domains and ages present a considerable limitation to 
providing empirical validation for a theory of development that spans 
the life-cycle . 
Although the call has long been out to operationalize Eriksonian 
concepts. the notion of ego identity "seems hopelessly broad and 
vague" (Bourne. l978a. p. 228). Erikson. himself. recognized the 
difficulty stemming from both broad and narrow use of his terms. In 
1968 Erikson wrote that: 
Identity and identity crisis have in popular and scientific 
usage become terms which alternately circumscribe 
something so large and seemingly self-evident that to 
demand a definition would almost seem petty, while at 
other times they designate something made so narrow for 
purposes of measurement that the overall meaning is lost. 
and it could just as well be called something else. (p. 15) 
Growing acceptance aside. Erikson's theory, as Looft (1973) 
pointed out, has generally been relegated to discussion sections as a 
sort of after-the-fact framework in which to discuss data already 
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obtained. Bourne (l978b) su ggested that the first step to validate 
Eriksonian theory is to broadly define Eriksonian dimensions and then 
articulate them in terms of more specific constructs. and that 
"comparing the nature and degree of convergence observed among 
the more specific constructs would serve to delineate the broader 
ones ... " (p. 386) . In other words, theoretical accuracy is furthered by 
bridging empirical findings . 
If Marcia's operationallzation of identity accurately captures the 
content of Erikson's theory, ego identity development should be 
related to the development of trust. autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
Marcia (1989) stated: 
If the identity statuses ... are, in fact, more or less 
accurate ... then the prediction would be that at late 
adolescence. when some of the interpersonal and familial 
dust has settled. those in higher identity statuses should 
be higher on sophisticated measures of adaptation than 
those in lower statuses. (p. 403) 
Such a comparison has not been made prior to this study. and is of 
inherent interest and importance to the field (Archer. 1992: Bourne, 
1978b: Caillet & Michael, 1983: Cote & Levine, 1989: Owen, 1984) . 
Lastly. by contrasting separate stage measures with the identity status 
paradigm. multistage psychosocial profiles can be established which 
are needed to verify psychosocial theory. 
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Identity status research has shown numerous advantages for 
persons in achievement and numerous disadvantages for persons in 
diffusion . If identity statuses are related to Eriksonian age-related 
stages. then psychosocially based (viz . • trust. autonomy. initiative, etc .) 
interventions could eventually be developed to assist young children, 
school children. and preadolescents early-on toward identity 
achievement. 
Operational Definitions 
Erikson's First Five Stages 
In order to understand psychosocial theory and identity status, 
conceptual definitions. and functions-as they relate to adolescent 
identity development-are needed. Erikson's first five psychosocial 
stages are (a) trust versus mistrust. (b) autonomy versus shame and 
doubt. (c) initiative versus gui.lt. (d) industry versus inferiority, and 
(e) identity versus role confusion. 
Trust. the first stage. represents the basic task to be resolved 
during infancy. A sense of trust includes a degree of personal 
7 
confidence and hope (budding faith) in oneself. in others, and in one's 
environment. An extreme sense of trust results in a maladaptive 
tendency toward sensory maladjustment (over-stimulation) . A 
predominance of mistrust is characterized by a sense of deprivation or 
abandonment. An extreme sense of mistrust results in a malignant 
tendency toward withdrawal (extreme avoidance) (Erikson, Erikson. 
& Kivinick. 1986). Erikson emphasized that a proper sense of trust, 
trustworthiness. and hope is a pervasive need during identity 
development (Erikson, 1968). Erikson portrayed such a sense in 
adolescence as indicative of the statement: "I am what hope I have and 
give" (p. 114). 
Autonomy. the second stage of development, can be resolved as 
early as age 2 or 3. If the adaptive ego strength of hope has been 
achieved. toddlers will begin to control their experiences (Erikson, 
1982) . Autonomy literally means self (autos) ruled (nomus). and is 
purportedly initiated through an increasing desire to assert one's will . 
Balanced resolution of stage two will produce an increased sense of 
self-control, cooperation, willpower, and freedom of self-expression. 
An extreme sense of autonomy results in a maladaptive tendency 
toward shameless willfulness. whereas. inadequate autonomy is 
evidenced by a sense of shame. doubt. loss of control. and compulsion. 
An extreme sense of shame and doubt results in a malignant tendency 
toward compulsion (Erikson et al .. 1986). Erikson (1968) wrote that 
resolution of the autonomy versus shame and doubt stage is vital to 
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identity development in that "the question is always whether we 
remain the masters ... by which things become more manageable or 
whether the rules master the ruler" (p . 112) and that "I am what I can 
will freely" (p . 114). 
Initiative becomes salient between the ages of about 4 to 7 when 
a person Is becoming capable of building upon a sense of autonomy and 
trust. Initiative is construed as the ability to begin and follow through 
with a task or a plan. Initiative is reflected in purpose-fulness. 
ambition. and self-will (versus self-control). An extreme excess of 
Initiative results in a maladaptive tendency toward ruthlessness. 
whereas. the antithetical outcome is guilt and its companions during 
identity development: anxiety. moralistic prohibition, and 
overcompensation (Erikson , 1968). An extreme sense of guilt results 
in a tendency toward malignant inhibition (Erikson et al., 1986). 
Erikson (1968) wrote that the "indispensable contribution of initiative 
to identity development.. .[is] the firmly established, steadily growing 
conviction ... that 'I am what I can imagine I will be'" (p. 122). 
Industry becomes relevant during the grade school years when 
children obtain a greater degree of conscience. The school-age child Is 
expected to learn and incorporate basic social skills to bring 
productive tasks to completion. Resolution of industry results in a 
sense of personal competence and worth-the opposite of which is 
disappointment and a stifling sense of inferiority. An extreme excess 
of industry results in a tendency toward narrow virtuosity. An extreme 
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lack of industry results in a tendency towards malignant inertia (a 
pervasive sense of failure) (Erikson et al., 1986) . Erikson (1968) wrote 
that a sense of industry is vital to identity development in that a 
person believes: "I am what I can learn to make work" (p. 127). 
Identity is achieved during adolescence-for purposes of this 
study defined as persons ages of 18 to 24-but achieved only if the 
challenges of previous stages have been successfully resolved. 
According to Erikson (1968) adolescence is "not an affliction, but a 
normative crisis" (p. 16). Identity is more than the sum of the previous 
stages-a synthesis and resynthesis encompassing all personal 
attitudes. aptitudes, identifications. and endowments with 
opportunities offered in environmental and social roles. Successful 
identity formation results in increased devotion. faith , and fidelity in 
the relationship between oneself and others. 
Whereas an overabundance of identity results in a maladaptive 
tendency toward fanaticism (destructive. militant totalism). a lack of 
identity results in a sense of discontinuity and role confusion (Erikson, 
1968). An extreme sense of role confusion results in repudiation 
(diffidence) (Erikson et a!., 1986). 
Marcia's Identity Statuses 
Marcia partitioned identity development into two dimensions: 
personal exploration and commitment. Presence and absence of these 
two criteria yield four identity statuses. defined as (a) achievement: a 
balance of commitment following exploration. (b) moratorium: a 
preponderance of exploration over commitment, (c) foreclosure: a 
preponderance of commitment over exploration. and (d) d![f'Usion: a 
lack of exploration and commitment. 
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Achievement represents the most sophisticated level of identity 
formation . An achieved individual is considered to have resolved a 
period of crisis and established firm, yet flexible, commitments. 
Studies have shown achieved individuals to have greater intelligence. 
greater levels of intimacy, and greater levels of interpersonal and 
social maturity compared to those in other identity statuses (see 
Adams, Bennion. & Huh. 1987b: Bourne, 1978a. 1978b) . 
Moratorium is considered the second most adaptive status of 
identity development. Individuals experiencing moratorium are 
considered to be in a state of crisis or exploration, and still largely 
ideologically and occupationally uncommitted. Moratoriums are 
characterized by higher levels of anxiety. authority conflict, and 
resistance to authoritarianism (see Adams et al .. 1987b: Bourne 1978a. 
1978b). 
Foreclosure is often considered one step above diffusion-though 
this perception is currently under dispute (Archer & Waterman. 
1990). Foreclosed individuals are persons who have formed firm 
commitments without having faced a period of personal 
crisis/exploration. Foreclosed individuals have been found to have 
close relationships with their parents. a high need for social approval. 
high levels of authoritarianism and conformity, and low levels of 
anxiety (see Adams eta!., l987b; Bourne. 1978a, l978b) . 
II 
Diffusion is considered the least sophisticated developmental 
level of identity formation. Diffused individuals have either not yet 
resolved or faced a crisis/exploration period and have not made strong 
commitments. Diffusion is characterized by a state of withdrawal, lack 
of commitment. lack of concern over a crisis or exploration. and by 
low levels of intimacy (see Adams eta!. , l987b: Bourne, l978a. 
l978b) . 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Epistemological Foundations of Identity 
12 
Nowhere has there been greater philosophical and scientific 
questioning than over the nature of humanity. Even if elucidated, the 
complexity of human individuality remains equally perplexing. Erikson 
(1982) wrote: "I myself could not relate . .. psychosocial theory without. 
paradoxically. discussing what is most individual in man and yet what 
is most basic for a communal sense of 'we'"' (p. 85). The venture to 
operationalize the nature of the self can be traced to antiquity. The 
fundamental question: What is a person? has been the focus of 
systematic epistemological inquiry at least as far back as the Classical 
period. A fitting foundation to such a question is the 4th century B.C. 
Socratic assumption that an unexamined life-whatever it consists 
of-is not worth living (Unger. 1990). 
Plato promulgated the view that self-conceived perceptions of 
reality are at best imperfect and transitory. According to Platonism. if 
a self exists it exists to some degree in uniqueness and isolation from 
reality. Conversely. Aristotle believed truth exists in perfect form and 
is discoverable by application of three essential proofs-logos (logic). 
13 
pathos (passion). and ethos (personal character) (Golden, Berquist, & 
Coleman. 1978). 
According to the Aristotelian view. in order to discover truth a 
person must have in oneself and understand about one's self the 
character traits associated with a truth . If a person's perceptions were 
imperfect. it is because that person had yet to attain the personal 
attributes (virtues)! requisite to such truth. Aristotle taught that these 
virtues are incorporated into one's self while engaging in appropriate 
activities, for the appropriate reasons. at the appropriate levels-the 
notion of the golden mean or finding the balance between dialectical 
conflicts. Such balance leads to a sense of eudaimonia. or joyous 
(sometimes translated: harmonious) true self-a feeling that what one 
is and what one does is in harmony with the universe . According to 
Waterman (1992). Aristotle's concept of e udaimonia is similar to the 
current identity conceptualizations of Deci and Ryan's (1985) intrinsic 
motivation. Maslow's (1964) peak experience, M. Csikszentmihalyi 
and I. S. Csikszentmihalyi's (1988) concept of flow, and to his own 
notion of personal expressiveness. 
An equivalent Eriksonian notion would be a "heightened 
awareness" (Erikson eta! ., 1986. p. 51) . Erikson's theory is consistent 
with the Aristotelian concept that appropriate activity is a necessary 
I The Aristotelian notion of virtue is much broader than the modem word usage. 
For a broader explication, see Aristotle's (1888) Nieomachean EthiCs. London: G. Belle & 
Sons. 
component of developing the self. Erikson et a!. (1986) referred to 
the process as a vital involvement wherein "the vital involvement in 
the worlds of people, materials, and ideas is the essential basis both 
for bringing into balance psychosocial tension" (p. 144) and for 
examining and reexamining personal identifications. 
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The question over concreteness versus relativeness of one's 
knowledge about oneself remained when. in the 1600s, Descartes 
wrote : "It is indeed surprising that I should comprehend more 
distinctly things that I can tell are doubtful. unknown. foreign to me, 
than what is real, what I am aware of-my very self' (Descartes, 1954, 
p. 71). This dilemma lead Descartes to develop a method of 
addressing such questions in empirical. separatist terms-I.e .. 
questions asked by individuals must be asked apart from the 
influences which may affect the question asker (Descartes, 1986). In 
other words , the search for the nature of human identity must assume 
the facility to divide (separate) psychological and social interactions . 
Descartes suggested that the more we separate the organism from its 
environment, the more clearly we will be able to define or explain the 
organism. This has become known as the Cartesian or "objective" 
approach-a perspective devoted to disinterested, value-free facts 
(Unger, 1990) . 
This point is recognized (and somewhat vital to this assumption 
of this study) in that Marcia 's model has its methodological basis in 
objectifying Erikson's fifth psychosocial stage-an effort ultimately 
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incompatible with Erikson's holistic view. Erikson et a!. (1986) wrote 
that: 
Although we are considering the themes separately as a 
gesture at clarity, we must emphasize that reviewing the 
eight psychosocial themes .. .in no way represents eight 
independent processes . Rather. the themes represent a 
set of perpetually intertwined concerns. inseparable by 
virtue of their lifelong interconnections .... (p. 144) 
By the 1700s. Cartesian empiricism had become the dominant 
scientific perspective. Hume. however. began to postulate that-on 
matters related to human nature-the objectivity pendulum had swung 
too far. In criticism Hume wrote: "This is the practice of talking about 
people as single beings in spite of the fact that they are constantly 
changing, and over a period of time may have changed completely" 
(Penelhum. 1955. p. 573). Hume came to be dissatisfied with an 
"objective" approach which confines the human domain entirely to 
reductionism. What Hume did offer was a new type of questioning 
regarding aspects of human nature. Hume would argue that we cannot 
ask: what Is a person, in the same way we ask: what is a stone. We 
must instead ask: in what does the identity of a person consist; or 
more specifically: what are the criteria we use in making judgments 
about the identity of a person (see Shoemaker. 1963). The issue of 
criteria has resurfaced in current identity-related theory-including 
the issue over how Marcia 's operationalization of the identity status 
relates to broader Eriksonian criteria. 
By the end of the 18th century. Hegel furthered the question 
over how the self is discovered, described. or defined . Hegelian 
philosophy places humans in a continuous state of becoming; 
therefore, however one sees an individual, the view is never totally 
accurate (Hegel. 1977). Now known as the Hegelian tradition, this 
"subjective" approach also posits that the human organism is 
inextricably linked to its environment. Therefore, any questions 
regarding the nature of human identity must include the social, 
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contextual, biological, and developmental forces in which it interacts. 
Lorraine (1990) wrote: 
... the self cannot be left out of any account of the world 
because the subject and object are moments in a whole of 
interpretation. If the self has a transformative effect, if the 
self creates reality as much as the self is created by reality, 
then an understanding of the selfs motivations and 
interest will help us understand the constraints on our 
claims to knowledge . (p . 7) 
Viewed from Hegelian philosophy, a personal identity is one's 
fluxuating interpretation of reality. Identity is developed by an 
individual 's ever-oscillating efforts to verifY inner interpretations of 
worldly experience. Erikson (1982) recognized the issue between the 
transitory versus permanency of one's identity. He wrote that the 
coining of the term ego originally stood for "the permanency of 
conscious experience." and added that its function was to allow for a 
flexible "mutual activation" with outer reality (Erikson. 1982. p. 89) . 
Nietzsche saw the question of whether or not the self is real as 
virtually immaterial. According to Nietzsche ( 1905). the self is not a 
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thing or a substance; it is a fiction. A self is not unified, stable, or 
coherent. If it appears so, it is only because an individual has 
succeeded in subordinating the profusion of conflicting instincts in 
such a way that stability and unity appear to align with the ruling 
milieu. Nietzsche added to the Hegelian view the concept of the 
"decentered self" or the notion that identity is a chaotic intersection 
of simultaneous. antisystemic interpretations of ourselves viewed from 
within and without. Albeit a more extreme view than Erikson 's, 
Nietzsche promulgated the idea that the development of one's identity 
is not totally conscious or rational. 
Early- and mid-20th century theorists. such as James. Mead. 
and Heidegger. have fully established the study of the self as a valid 
epistemological field apart from philosophy. Heidegger ensconced the 
self as a res cogitans or a thinking thing-that an identity is a 
relationship or a stand we actively develop toward the outside world 
(Heidegger. 1973). Such a view sees one's identity develop not out of 
experience but out of process-wherein a person actively evaluates 
interpretations of one's experiences after the fact. 
James' (1910) notion of self led to the concepts of the social 
self. the material self, and the spiritual self. James (1920) also spoke 
of the ego's active tension (being similar to the Aristotelian dialectic 
notion of the golden mean) . Erikson studied. adopted, and 
incorporated James' idea of balance versus extremes as a basic tenet of 
ego health (Erikson, 1982) . This served to demarcate the 
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epistemological distinction between notions of self and notions of 
identity. However. the term ego, as used by James. Freud, Mead. and 
Erikson. is generally synonymous with the term "self' -being 
translated from the German word Ich and the Latin root eg or. in 
English I . Mead (1934) further developed the distinction with the I, 
me, and the generalized other troika, while Freud conceptualized the 
self as having three interacting dimensions-the id, ego, and superego. 
Erikson's adaptations on ego identity were (and still are) consistent 
with the theoretical commonalities of James', Freud's, and Mead's 
works. 
Erikson ( 1982) portrayed the ego as having the function of 
integrating experience in su ch a way that an individual can be (a) an 
effective doer rather than an impotent s ufferer, (b) active and 
originating rather than inactive or passive. (c) centered and inclusive 
rather than shunted to the periphery. (d) selective rather than 
overwhelmed. and (e) aware rather than confounded. This in turn 
served to provide a sense of identity or the "sense of being at home in 
one 's time and place, and, somehow, of feeling chosen even as one 
chooses" (Erikson, l982, p. 89). Stemming from the previous works of 
other theorists. Erikson constructed a series of assumptions on ego 
identity more sweeping and delineated than had been heretofore 
presented (Bourne , 1978a) . 
In summary. issues regarding identity have a long and somewhat 
systematic evolution. Originally. the concept of self was seen as 
19 
pertaining to the realm of philosophers and theologians. Later, in the 
age of empiricism. the nature of human self was assessed within 
reductionist. separatist parameters . Eventually, the self was 
recognized as being so complex, so time- and context-bound, and so 
individualized, that any conclusion must be viewed as subjective. By the 
mid-20th century, social scientists promulgated the multidimension-
ality of the self. This last step has lead to the partitioning of various 
issues of the self to the realms of diverse fields of study such as 
psychology, sociology, biology, philosophy, and so forth. Such 
separating of the study of human behavior or motivation into discrete 
elements comes at some cost to theory development. Sarason (1981) 
wrote that: 
.. . theory rests on conceptions about what man is and. 
therefore, about what he can be ... if you start with different 
assumptions about what man is and is capable of and 
change the context accordingly, people look and develop 
very differently ... theories and their implementation can be 
self-fulfilling, for good or bad. (p. 131) 
By addressing the numerous psychological, social. and biological 
aspects of development. Erikson's theory represents an integration of 
epistemological notions, ancient and modern. into a systematic 
perspective of the self-of which ego identity is a part. 
Foundations of Erikson's Ego Identity Theory 
Erikson's conceptualization of ego identity combines the internal 
psychological aspects of Freud's concept of ego as well as the 
sociological aspects presented by James and Mead. Additionally. 
Erikson's theory of identity development Integrates "several novel 
features not present in any previous conception" (Boume. 1978a, p . 
224) . Erikson (1982) wrote that: 
... a human being's existence depends at every moment on 
three processes of organization that must complement 
each other. There is. in whatever order. the biological 
process of the hierarchic organization of organ systems 
constituting a body (soma) : there is the psychic process 
organizing individual experience by ego synthesis 
(psyche); and there is the communal process of the 
cultural organization of the interdependence of persons 
(ethos) ... .in the end. all three approaches are necessary for 
the clarification of any intact human event. (p. 26) 
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The underlying assumptions of Erikson's theory are that identity 
formation (a) develops according to sequences or "analogous pattems" 
(Erikson. 1982. p. 27) : that (b) individual variations are "predeter-
mined in the grcwing person's readiness" (Erikson. 1963. p. 270): 
and that (c) society tends to "encourage the proper rate and the 
proper sequence of their unfolding" (p . 270)-a general process 
Erikson labeled epigenesis. 
Congruence among psychological. biological. and social realms of 
a person's experience will result in healthy identity formation . Erikson 
(1968) wrote: 
The young person, in order to experience wholeness. must 
feel a progressive continuity between that wh ich he has 
come to be during the long years of childhood and that 
which he promises to become in the anticipated future: 
between that which he conceives himself to be and that 
which he perceives others to see in him and to expect of 
him ... The wholeness to be achieved at this stage I have 
called a sense of inner identity. (p. 87) 
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This identity process assumes role-taking and cognitive capacity 
at levels at least sufficient to execute dialectic choice (i.e., good versus 
bad, one's own perspective versus other's [or society's] perspective) 
(Adams, 1992). Considering normal cognitive. biological, social, and 
historical development, Erikson posits that identity development is 
most expedient during adolescence (Erikson. 1968). 
The interrelating psychosocial aspects of the identity stage are 
numerous and varied. As with each of the other stages. the identity 
stage results in either a healthy balance or an unhealthy imbalance (an 
extreme in either direction) . An excessive identity would be 
maladaptive as would excessive identity confusion (Erikson et al., 
1986). According to Erikson. a healthy identity results from (and 
exists in) the creative tension involved in balancing a sense of identity 
and identity (role) confusion. 
The primary dimensions of concern to the adolescent identity 
stage involve (a) the identity crisis, (b) ego versus superego domin-
ance, (c) a humanistic versus technological orientation, and (d) an 
appropriate value orientation (Cote & Levine, 1987) . The identity 
crisis. as portrayed by Erikson (1968). is "a necessary turning point, a 
crucial moment. when development must move one way or another, 
marshalling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation" 
(p. 16). This complex interaction involves (a) constitutional givens, 
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(b) idiosyncratic libidinal needs. (c) favored capacities. (d) significant 
identifications. (e) effective defenses, (fl successful sublimations, and 
(g) consistent roles (Erikson, 1968). 
Erikson (1968) stated that the issue of ego/superego dominance 
impacts identity development in that a counterbalancing of childhood 
inequalities and a weakening of the dominance of the superego helps 
lead to a positive identity. According to Cote and Levine (1989). 
Erikson assumes that an ego-dominated identity is the ·most desirable 
outcome of the identity stage in contemporary society" (p . 392). 
Erikson (1968) additionally spoke of two basic sources of 
contemporary identity and Identity confusion: faith in technology or In 
a kind of humanism. A technological orientation is to have a higher 
degree of confidence in social. political. and technological structures, 
whereas. a humanistic orientation is having a higher degree of belief in 
the subjectivity of humankind and its agencies. Because people 
"become what they do" (Erikson. 1968, p. 31), resolution of this 
aspect of identity occurs best during a time of tentativeness and 
questioning-indicative of the institutionalized moratorium of 
adolescence (Erikson, 1968) . 
The fourth factor pertinent to identity development is the 
development of a value orientation. Erikson suggested three hierarchal 
value orientations (a) the moral. (b) the ideological, and (c) the ethical. 
The moral stage is a childlike belief in authority. The ideological stage. 
often associated with adolescence. entails the attempt to reconcile or 
adapt to social contradictions. The ethical stage is a more advanced, 
possibly elaborate. framework from which an individual accounts for 
what things are, why things are, and how things ought to be. 
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According to Erikson (1968). identity formation may take a 
variety of possible courses. It Is assumed that an identity crisis has 
certain discernible elements (a) its occurrence. (b) its severity, (c) its 
prolongation, and (d) its aggravation . Furthermore, Erikson relates 
such dimensions of identity formation as capable of enhancing (or 
detracting from) developmental outcomes, adaptiveness. life-
structure, continuity, mutuality, flexibility, existential meaning, and 
purpose. Many of these terms have specific Eriksonian connotations 
regarding identity (see Erikson. 1959, 1968, 1982). By adaptiveness, 
Erikson refers to one's capacity for positive social interaction. 
Continuity is a sense of being at home with one's self. Mutuality is a 
sense of reciprocal relationship with others . Existential meaning 
refers to the capacity to see one's relationship to the world. Purpose 
concerns one's motivation to live one's identity. 
Evolving aspects of each previous stage are pertinent to the 
resolution of the identity stage. Furthermore, identity issues "in some 
form" are pertinent throughout the life-span (Erikson, 1963, p . 271) . 
Therefore. for Erikson, identity development is similar to the 
Hegelian and Nietzschian temporal-spatial conception that identity is 
often transitory, volatile , and irresolute. Were this not the case , the 
syntonic and dystonic balance following any normal stage resolution 
would be considered too permanent and inflexible, thus preventing 
the resolution (for good or bad) of issues inherent to subsequent 
stages. 
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While it is not yet empirically established, Eriksonian theory 
presumes that individuals do not get indefinitely "stuck" in a stage. 
That a stage may be prolonged appears so. but a person must 
nonetheless move on to subsequent age-related stages regardless of 
resolution of previous stages. With regard to the identity stage, even a 
most protracted moratorium must eventually come to an end (Erikson, 
1968). While the end of a stage is frequently referred to as a 
developmental product or outcome. such concrete delineations 
between stages are not empirically precise and still theoretically 
unclear (Caillet & Michael. 1983). For this reason. Eriksonian notions 
of development (particularly. intrastage development) may be viewed 
as being processes rather than outcomes or products. The extent to 
which process or product prevails over the other is currently under 
theoretical dispute. However. Erikson has pointed out that the English 
language lacks appropriate semantic differentiation between becoming 
something and being something (Erikson eta!., 1986). 
Erikson 's notion of ego identity is not simply the sum of one's 
reflections. perceptions, and cognition of oneself. Bourne (l978a) 
wrote that Erikson's theory differs from purely psychological theories 
in that ego identity includes "a sense of oneself defined in terms of a 
particular relationship to a certain group. community, or society" (p. 
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227) . The broadest definition of the Eriksonian notion of identity is an 
ongoing process of formation. consolidation. and reconciliation 
between past experience , present crises. and future expectations 
(Erikson. 1968). 
In relation to previous theoretical perspectives. Erikson's 
epistemological foundations of ego identity appear to take an 
intermediate position between the objective/concrete/lasting 
dimensions (as promoted by Cartesian perspective) and the 
subjective/immaterial/ephemeral dimensions (as promoted by the 
Hegelian perspective). On the one hand, Erikson supports Cartesian 
objectivity with the existence of a framework of systematic and 
universal sequences/issues of development. On the other hand, 
Erikson allows for Hegelian subjectivity with almost infinite human 
variation within such a framework. Erikson's view of identity seems 
most consistent with Heidegger 's notions of the self: that being human 
is treated as a relation in which one takes a stand towards one's 
everyday activities. and that to be human is to be a placeholder of 
internal relations with the outside world (Heidegger. 1973). 
This brief review serves not as a definitive explication of 
Erikson's theory but to illustrate the vastness and complexity of his 
conceptualization of ego identity development. Furthermore, it 
expounds the similarities and uniqueness Eriksonian theory has to his 
epistemological predecessors. 
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Foundations of Marcia's Ego Identity Status Paradigm 
Marcia's original research on identity status was devised to 
establish the "empirical validity of an important part of Erikson's 
psychosocial theory"-that of ego identity (Marcia. 1989. p. 401). 
Theretofore . studies had not dealt "explicitly with the psychosocial 
criteria for determining degree of ego identity" (Marcia, 1966). 
Marcia (1989) later recalled of the venture that "there was no 
intention that anything especially practical. except good theory, would 
ever result from it" (p. 401). The ego identity status model has 
become a standard from which numerous psychosocial, psychological. 
sociological. academic. personality, intelligence. interpersonal. and 
moral studies have been (and continue to be) based and/or compared 
(Bourne. 1978a). Furthermore. Marcia's paradigm has become the 
primus inter pares operationalization of the identity stage (Cote & 
Levine, l988a). 
Marcia 's (1966) attempt to validate Erikson's notion of identity 
achievement/diffusion began with the operationalization of the identity 
statuses as "polar outcomes ... along a continuum" (p. 551) . The criteria 
Marcia used to contrive the statuses consisted of two variables. crisis 
(i.e .. exploration) and commitment. These criteria were assessed by 
measuring three content areas: occupational choice, religion, and 
political ideology (Marcia, 1966). 
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Marcia (1966) defined the identity crisis as a period of 
exploration during adolescence when an individual is engaged in 
evaluating past beliefs. weighing meaningful alternatives. and 
considering choices. Marcia defined commitment as the degree of 
personal investment an individual exhibits toward his/her beliefs. 
Using exploration/commitment criteria. Marcia (1966) contrived four 
identity statuses: identity-achieved. moratorium. foreclosed . and 
identity-diffused . The identity-achieved status is assumed to be the 
most adaptive of the statuses. Such an individual has firm commit-
ments following an active period of exploration. The achieved 
individual is seen as most "free to act" and. in general, not likely to be 
"overwhelmed by sudden shifts in his environment or by unexpected 
responsibilities" (Marcia. 1966, p . 552). 
When compared to other statuses. identity-achieved individuals 
have been found to be less worried and less extreme in their introver-
sion or extroversion (Adams. Ryan. Hoffman. Dobson. & Nielsen. 
1985) . They also appear to be more adaptive and open in family 
functioning (Papini. Micka. & Barnett. 1989). They tend to exhibit 
high levels of intimacy (Bennion & Adams. 1986). low levels of self-
consciousness (Adams. Abraham. & Markstrom. 1987), and are most 
content with working either alone or with others (Kroger. 1990). 
Identity-achieved subjects scored significantly higher than foreclosed 
or diffused subjects on measures of cognitive development and decision-
making (Blustein & Phillips. 1990) . Achieved individuals also scored 
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highest on a general measure of psychological development (Owen, 
1984) . Overall, these correlates are consistent with Marcia's portrayal 
that identity-achieved individuals are strong, self-directed, and highly 
adaptive (see Waterman. 1992). From clinical studies of persons in 
each status. Josselson (1973) presented the perspective of the 
achieved identity as: "I have an effect on the world, therefore I am." 
The identity-diffused subject. whether or not he/she has 
experienced a crisis, is primarily characterized by lack of 
commitment. This lack of commitment is assumed to stem from 
apathy and disinterest (Marcia. 1966). Without repeating the studies 
previously listed under identity-achievement, diffused persons have 
typically been found to be stressed. to be either introverted or 
extroverted , to lack intimacy, and to have few close opposite-sex 
friends. Diffused subjects score lower (compared to achieved youths) 
on cognitive development. formal reasoning, decision-making, and 
moral reasoning. Diffusions have been found to be withdrawn. yet most 
desirous for relatedness with others (Kroger. 1990). highly influenced 
by peers and authority demands (Adams et al., 1985). and highly self-
conscious (Adams et al., l987a) . Diffusions also report the highest 
rates of illicit substance use (Jones & Hartmann, 1988). These 
findings, too, are consistent with Marcia 's characterization of diffused 
persons-that they are likely to be either highly careless, passive. 
defensive. and/or psychopathic (Waterman, 1992). Josselson (1973) 
portrayed the diffused identity perspective as: "I feel. therefore I am." 
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In terms of adaptability and overall identity development. the 
identity status considered next to identity achievement is moratorium. 
In support of this proposition. moratorium individuals score similar to 
achieved individuals on numerous measures (see Adams et al., 1987a) . 
This similarity has emerged for measures of introversion/extroversion 
(Adams et al .. 1985). intimacy (Bennion & Adams. 1986). and decision-
making (Blustein & Phillips . 1990). However. moratoriums scored 
lowest on a general measure of psychosocial development (Owen. 
1984) . Compared to foreclosed/diffused persons. moratoriums also 
show lower levels of self-consciousness (Adams et al .. 1987a). 
Persons in moratorium are presumed to be in a crisis 
period-which assumes an active struggle to make commitments 
(Marcia. 1966) . Moratoriums appear least willing to be subordinate to 
group leaders (Donovan. 1975): they score lowest on measures of 
authoritarianism (Bennion & Adams. 1986). and they are least likely to 
be dependent on familiar settings (Kroger. 1990). These findings are 
consistent with Marcia's notion that there are healthy and pathological 
aspects to each identity status (achieved status excepted) and his 
depiction of moratorium individuals as likely to be either highly 
sensitive or anxious. highly ethical or self-righteous. and highly flexible 
or vacillating (see Waterman. 1992). Josselson (1973) portrayed the 
moratorium perspective as: "! am right. therefore I am." 
The remaining status is foreclosed. describing individuals who 
accept-apparently without crisis or questioning-the wishes and 
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beliefs of their parents or other authority figures (Marcia, 1966) . The 
personality of a foreclosed person is characterized as rigid and closed-
minded (Bennion & Adams, 1986). Foreclosed individuals have been 
found to be impulsive (Cella, DeWolfe. & Fitzgibbon, 1987), more 
dependent on others in decision-making activities (Blustein & 
Phillips. 1990), and they seek the security of familiar settings (Kroger, 
1990) . Read , Adams, and Dobson (1984) found that foreclosed 
individuals were not likely to be analytical or philosophical. 
Foreclosures report themselves to be very close to their parents 
(Campbell, Adams, & Dobson, 1984). and they are most likely to have 
come from an intact family (Streitmatter, 1987). In a study by Owen 
(1984] , foreclosed individuals scored second only to achieved 
individuals on a general measure of psychosocial development. Overall, 
these correlates are consistent with Marcia's portrayal of foreclosed 
individuals as being-according to one's interpretation-either highly 
rigid or steadfast, highly dogmatic or committed. and highly 
conforming or cooperative (see Waterman, 1992). They have the 
lowest frequency of illicit substance use (Jones & Hartmann, 1988). 
Josselson (1973) referred to the foreclosure as: ·r am loved. 
therefore, I am." 
The aforementioned findings associated with each status are a 
representation of findings made since Bourne's (1978a, 1978b) review 
of identity (see also the Adams eta!., 1987b review). Additionally, from 
1988 through early-1992. over 50 studies and 30 dissertations have 
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involved the ego identity status paradigm (APA. 1992) . One 
dissertation on identity status differences between Anglo and Cuban 
American males (Owen, 1984) found that only the achieved status was 
positively related to general psychosocial development 
(r = .29)-as measured by the Inventory of Psychosocial Development 
(Constantinople. 1969) and the Objective Measure of Ego Identity 
Status (Adams. Shea, & Fitch. 1979). Negative relationships between 
identity status and general psychosocial development were (from 
h1ghest to lowest): moratorium r = -.39, diffused r = -.36, and 
foreclosed r = -.29 (Owen. 1984). The negative correlation between 
moratorium status and psychosocial development may point to 
theoretical and/or measurement discrepancies between Erikson's and 
Marcia's paradigms. Either the models are not totally compatible or 
the sample and/or measures used in Owen's (1984) study were 
inadequate and/or inappropriate . 
By broadly (and subjectively) categorizing findings which may 
pertain to issues related to psychosocial developmental, a general 
profile may indicate a relationship between identity status and 
Erikson's first four stages. One of the difficulties in interpreting 
Identity status studies based on Eriksonian theory is that few. if any, of 
the identity status studies can be easily (not to mention definitively) 
related to a psychosocial concept (i.e .. shame/doubt. guilt: initiative, 
industry. etc.). Furthermore, resolution of an Eriksonian stage is based 
on the notion of dialectic balance between the syntonic and dystonic 
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aspects of a stage. Simply because a study finds that moratorium status 
respondents have high levels of autonomy does not necessarily 
indicate they have an appropriate balance between autonomy or 
shame/doubt or that shame/doubt has even been measured. This 
difficulty of identifying balanced resolution is present even in 
Eriksonian-based measures (see Caillet & Michael. 1983). For this 
reason, only studies which included descriptors related to balance 
(i.e .. flexible. adaptive. less extreme) were categorized as resolved. 
Previous identity status research relating to Erikson 's first four 
psychosocial stages (Tables 1-4) is indicative of the following: (a) an 
absence of studies which relate any resolved or syntonic psychosocial 
trait to the diffused status indicates a general Jack of resolution across 
all four psychosocial stages; (b) the predominance of studies which 
relate resolved and syntonic traits to the achieved status indicates 
broad psychosocial resolution across all four psychosocial stages; 
(c) the mixture of studies which related syntonic and dystonic traits in 
the moratorium and foreclosure statuses indicates moderate or 
transitory psychosocial resolution. In particular. foreclosure status is 
indicative of higher levels of trust and lower levels of autonomy. 
Moratorium status is indicative of on-going crisis in the autonomy 
versus shame/doubt stage. These interpretations are consistent with 
current identity status theory (Stephen. Fraser. & Marcia, 1992). 
Table l 
Studies Related to the Achieved Status and Psychosocial Development 
trust/ 
mlstrust 
autonomy/ 
shame and 
doubt 
tnltlatlve/ 
guilt 
Syntonic Trait 
Industry I htgher motivation to 
infenorlty achieve (Orlofsky. 
1977) 
Balanced/Resolved 
more adaptive and open In 
family f unctlonlng (Paplnl. 
Micka. & Bamett. 1989) 
more close relationships 
(Orlofsky. Marcia. & Lessor. 
1973) 
content with working 
alone or with others 
(Kroger. 1990) 
low levels of self-con-
sciousness 
(Adams et a!.. 1987b) 
flexible decision-making 
(Blusleln & Phillips. 1990) 
Dystonic Trait 
less extreme In Introversion or 
extroversion (Adams et al.. 
1985) 
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Table 2 
Studies Related to the Moratorium Status and Psychosocial Development 
trust/ 
mistrust 
Syntonic Trait 
autonomy/ least willing to sub-
shame and ordinate to leaders 
doubt (Donovan. 1975) 
Initiative/ 
guilt 
industry/ 
Lnfeliority 
lowest on submissive-
ness (Bennion & 
Adams, 1986) 
least likely to be 
attached (Kroger. 
1990) 
higher motivation 
to achieve 
(Orlofsky. 1977) 
Balanced/Resolved 
more close relationships 
( Orlofsky et a! .. 1973) 
low self-consciousness 
(Adams et al .. 1987b) 
flexible decision-making 
(Blusleln & Phillips, I 990) 
less extreme tn Introver-
sion or extroversion 
(Adams eta!.. 1985) 
Dystonic Trait 
highest on anxiety 
(3 studies) 
most likely to change 
major (Waterman & 
Waterman, 1974) 
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Table 3 
Studies Related to the Foreclosed Status and Psychosocial Development 
trust/ 
mistrust 
autonomy/ 
shame and 
doubt 
lnltiallve I 
guilt 
tndustry/ 
Inferiority 
Syntonic Trait Bala nced/Resolved 
submissive to authority 
(5 studles) 
seeks security of familiar 
settings (Kroger. 1990) 
close to their parents 
(Campbell et al. . 1984) 
Impulsive 
(CeDa et al.. 1987) 
Dystonic Trait 
not likely to be 
analytical 
or philosophical 
(Read eta! .. 1984) 
dependent on others In 
decision-making (Blustetn 
& Phillips. 1990) 
low mollvauon to 
achieve (Orlofsky. 
1977) 
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Table 4 
Studies Related to the Diffused Status and Psychosocial Development 
trust/ 
mistrust 
a utonomy/ 
shame and 
doubt 
lnltiallve/ 
guilt 
industry/ 
inferiority 
Syntonic Trait Balanced/Resolved Dystonic Trail 
less adaptive in 
family funclioning 
(Paplnl et al ., 1989) 
withdrawn 
(Kroger, 1990) 
few close relationships 
(Orlofsky et al.. 1973) 
high levels of 
selfconsciousness 
(Adams et al .. 1987b) 
conform tn stressful 
situations (Toder & 
Marcia, 1973) 
emotional decision-
making (Blustetn & 
Ph1llips. 1990) 
extreme tn tntroversion 
(Adams et al.. 1985) 
low motivation to 
achieve (Orlofsky. 
1977) 
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Marcia's Convergence/Divergence with Erikson 
It is generally recognized in the field of developmental 
psychology that Erikson's theory is vast and complex and, therefore, 
difficult to translate, operationalize, and validate. Marcia took one 
aspect of Erikson's theory, stage five. and made such an attempt. This 
has resulted in the ego identity status paradigm being seen by many as 
the most appropriate means to empirically investigate Er!ksonian 
theory on the identity stage. 
However, a debate has surfaced in recent years regarding the use 
of Marcia's paradigm as a means to capture the intent of Eriksonian 
psychosocial theory. This debate was voiced largely through the 
arguments of Cote and Levine (1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1989). In 
opposition to the notion of convergence with Erikson 's theory. Cote 
and Levine (1988b) contended that Marcia's paradigm focuses too 
much on limited operational definitions and not enough on underlying 
theoretical definitions, and that it amounts more or less to tautology. 
Waterman (1988) characterized the arguments of Cote and Levine as a 
"deceptively effective critique" (p. 185). The following summary of 
those issues is offered with the caveat that neither their arguments 
nor this study is designed to definitively resolve this dispute. 
Marcia's paradigm has addressed. more so than any previous 
attempt, at least one important issue of identity-namely the 
formulation of commitments . However. Cote and Levine (l988a) 
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claimed this has led to an overemphasis on psychological aspects of 
Identity formation . They argued that to be consistent with Erikson's 
theory, Marcia's model should also include sociological, historical, 
biological. and familial aspects of identity development. Cote and 
Levine (1988b) concluded that Marcia's model is too limited in scope 
to tap the broad and complex aspects of identity development. 
Waterman (1988) argued that such narrowing is not wrong. but 
necessary and customary in empirically based. psychological research. 
Waterman (1988) stated that Marcia never intended to produce a 
model which entirely blanketed Erikson's theory. It seems reasonable 
to embrace a theory while at the same time "focus on different 
descriptive elements and on different functions" of that theory 
(Waterman. 1988, p. 187) . 
Because Marcia's paradigm is parsimonious and easily grasped. 
some researchers are beginning to augment his model as well. Archer 
(1989) and Stephen et al. (1992) pointed to an identity cycle referred 
to as MAMA (moratorium-achiever-moratorium-achiever). Another 
possible cycle is foreclosure-moratorium-foreclosure-moratorium 
(FMFM). and so forth. Kroger and Haslett (1991) and Bosma (1992). 
too. have suggested that ego identity has several pathways. Other 
theorists have suggested that the use of substatuses (viz ., alienated 
achievers. expressive foreclosures. nonexpressive moratoriums) will 
further the utility of Marcia's paradigm (Waterman, 1992). 
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Josselson (1973). however. wrote that this type of unrestrained 
theoretical evolution has produced an "uninterpretable mass of 
findings . .. [which] often strayed from theoretical underpinnings which 
might guide interpretation of results" (p. 7). It may be viewed by some 
that identity status researchers are including elements theoretically 
different from Erikson's notions . Cote and Levine (1988a) made the 
point that most of Erikson's work on the identity stage came out after 
Marcia developed his paradigm in 1964-a situation analogous to the 
egg laying the chicken. However. it could equally be argued that 
theories are not defmitive, and without change they may never fully 
mature. Furthermore, the groundwork for Erikson's theory-including 
his ideas on ego identity development-originated in 1950. In either 
case, occasional comparisons need to be made to insure that both 
theories are still compatible . Erikson (1982) wrote that while 
theorists "can and must always discover such 'new' aspects of human 
nature as are reflected in the epidemiological trends of the times, 
their interpretation must. at any given time, allow for ... historical 
relativity" (p . 31) . 
Another concern of Cote and Levine is that Marcia has portrayed 
identity achievement as a status or outcome. rather than a process. 
Marcia, himself. (1989) has responded to this point saying: 
It is with some vexation that. in the face of continued 
misunderstanding, I find that I must repeat what I said 
about ten years ago: "The identity process neither begins 
nor ends with adolescence ... Resolution of the identity issue 
at adolescence guarantees only that one \vill be faced with 
subsequent identity 'crises.' A well-developed identity 
structure, like a well-developed superego, is flexible . It is 
open to changes in society and in relationships." (p. 406) 
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The resolution of this issue may lie in Bosma's (1992) notion of 
multiphase identity development. or Kroger and Haslett's (1991) 
concept of multipathway development, or Waterman's (1992) theory of 
multidlmension development. Others have also suggested that separate 
domains exist for males and females (Cella et al., 1987). But if It is true 
that identity development has such interstatus transience and/or 
intrastatus variability-and this is not certain (see Streitmatter. 1993; 
Stephen et al., 1992; & Waterman, 1982)-it is reasonable to question 
the use of the term status. Waterman (1988) agreed that the term is 
somewhat awkward and potentially confusing. but defends the use of 
Marcia's terms based on their wide use and recognition . On the other 
hand. Erikson (1982) has stated of such situations that "termin-
ology .. . has come to convey a certain ritualistic conviction rather than 
the persistent hope of strict scientific substantiation" (p. 17). 
Another concern rises over the question of whether or not 
Marcia's identity statuses are elitist. in that they (a) portray a type of 
Identity achievement which is not within the norms of society, and 
(b) portray the most preferred path of development as always going 
through the moratorium status. The Archer and Waterman (1983) 
review of numerous studies on adolescent (most often college 
students) identity development concluded that only a minority (as low 
as 4%) of adolescents were categorizable as identity-achieved, and that 
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a majority of adolescents are most likely to be categorized as 
foreclosed or diffused (see also Archer & Waterman, 1990). Waterman 
(1988) did point out that when identity status scores of college age 
subjects are broken down into specific identity content domains of 
vocational choice, religion. and political ideology. the percentage of 
indiViduals categorized as achieved rises to 40o/o, 25o/o, and 20o/o, 
respectively. 
Despite issues of measurement. Waterman (1988) contended 
that Marcia's model shares many communalities with Erikson's theory. 
These include the contextual domains of vocation. religion, politics. 
parental influence. and so forth. Furthermore. Marcia's paradigm 
recognizes the importance of development in early and later 
Eriksonian stages while at the same time restricting application of 
identity status theory to adolescence. Marcia's paradigm also 
corresponds to Erikson's View of identity stage development in that it 
is conflict-driven and progressive from initially amorphous to highly 
delineated. 
Waterman (1988) pointed out areas where Marcia's paradigm 
diverges from Erikson's theory. For example, Waterman claimed many 
theorists have adopted the psychodynamic View of Marcia, while 
rejecting Eriksonian concepts which are psychoanalytical or 
psychosexual. Waterman also recognized Marcia's and Erikson's 
differing Views with regard to methodological approach-Erikson's 
being largely clinical and Marcia's being empirical. Waterman (1988) 
wrote : 
Since idiographic and nomothetic methodologies generate 
different types of knowledge, it is not to be expected that 
the theories derived from work with the respective 
paradigms will map onto each other with one-to-one 
correspondence. (p. 197) 
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Therefore, both Waterman (1988) and Cote and Levine (1988a, 
1988b) have agreed that Marcia's paradigm differs from Erikson. 
Adams, however, (1992) did not see this as an issue; he wrote that as 
researchers ... continue their work we shall see many 
differing and viable alternatives to the study of adolescent 
identity formation and development that began with the 
theoretical foundations of Erikson ... followed by the 
conceptualization and measurement of ego-identity 
statuses as constructed by Marcia, which are now being 
deconstructed, reconstructed, and modified by a different 
generation of scholars. (p. 8) 
It is important to be cognizant of the fact the theories do not 
develop in a vacuum; what affects one will eventually affect others. This 
leads to the foremost issue of this debate : Has the evolution of Marcia's 
paradigm coincided with or become separate from the evolution of 
Erikson 's theory? Cote and Levine (1988a, 1988b) have argued that 
the simplicity of Marcia's model (including its purportedly narrower 
scope, limited definitions, potentially confusing terms, and even the 
reliability of its instruments) has lead researchers to either 
deliberately or unwittingly ignore or misunderstand the broader 
notions of Erikson's theory of identity development. Erikson seems to 
agree this could happen. Erikson (1968) wrote that: 
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.. . for the sake of logical or experimental maneuverability 
(and in order to keep in good academic company) they try 
to treat these terms as matters of social roles, personal 
traits. or conscious self-images, shunning the less 
manageable and more sinister-which often means the 
more vital-implications of the concept. (p. 16) 
The evolution of Marcia's paradigm will likely have an effect on 
the interpretation, application, scope. direction, and overall evolution 
of Eriksonian theory. In some cases. studies which were based on 
Marcia's model have lead researchers to question the validity of 
Erikson's theory. For example. Archer (1989) summarized an identity 
status-based study by stating that "it appears that the identity activity 
of our adolescents and youth does not meet the expectations of 
Erikson's theory" (p. 353). In this case either Erikson's theory 
appears faulty or Marcia's paradigm is inappropriately linked with 
Erikson's theory. 
Establishing the nexus between varying notions of identity is 
seen by theorists and researchers alike as a "catalyst for the creation 
of many new and emerging perspectives" (Adams. 1992, p . 3). Of 
course. many already see Erikson's original theory as such a broad and 
practical approach. What is not clear is how Marcia's paradigm relates 
to it. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Questions and Design 
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In order to assess the relationship between Marcia's identity 
status paradigm and Erikson's psychosocial theory, the following null 
hypotheses will be addressed . 
l. The achieved status will not differ from the moratorium status 
on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
2 . The achieved status will not differ from the foreclosed status 
on measures of trust, autonomy, initiative. and industry. 
3. The achieved status will not differ from the diffused status on 
measures of trust, autonomy. initiative. and industry. 
4 . The moratorium status will not differ from the foreclosed 
status on measures of trust, autonomy, initiative. and industry. 
5. The moratorium status will not differ from the diffused status 
on measures of trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
6. The foreclosed status will not differ from the diffused status 
on measures of trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
This multi-instrument, correlational study is designed to 
increase discrimination between identity statuses and psychosocial 
maturity. The four independent variables are psych osocial maturity 
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scores as measured on stages one through four of the Eriksonian 
Psychosocial Stage Inventory (EPSI) (Rosenthal et al .. 1981). as well as 
by separate, stage-related instruments-the trust stage by the 
Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter. 1967). the autonomy stage by the 
Emotional Autonomy Scale (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). the 
initiative stage by the Initiative/Guilt subscales of the Ego Stage 
Development Inventory (Caillet. 1980). and the industry stage by the 
Self-Efficacy Scale (Sherer et al .. 1982) . The dependent variable is 
identity status as determined by classifications on the Extended 
Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (EOM-EIS-2) (Bennion & 
Adams. 1986). 
The four subscores of the EPSI and the separate stage measures 
corresponding to each psychosocial stage will provide a basis to 
compare psychosocial maturity with the four identity statuses. If. as 
has been suggested since the inception of the identity status model. 
identity status and psychosocial maturity are related . the achieved 
status will correspond to higher levels of adaptiveness on all 
psychosocial measures . Scores of diffused status respondents are 
expected to be characteristically lower across all psychosocial 
measures. Foreclosed and moratorium individuals are expected to 
report mixed levels of psychosocial adaptiveness. In particular. it Is 
expected that the foreclosed status will be related to higher levels of 
trust and lower levels of autonomy than the moratorium respondents. 
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Measurement 
In order to assess psychosocial/identity status relationships, two 
instruments pertaining to each of the first four psychosocial stages 
(trust, autonomy, initiative, industry) are included in this study. Each 
separate stage instrument was selected based on construct validity and 
reliability studies. 
An essential matter of importance to this study is the amount of 
shared variability between and within psychosocial stage measures. In 
order to maximize the variation between Eriksonian stages as they 
relate to the different identity statuses. it is vital that shared variation 
across trust. autonomy. initiative. and industry is neither too large nor 
too small. This is a paradox for if. as Erikson suggests. the resolution 
of a given stage is contingent upon resolution of a previous stage. then 
an unspecified amount of shared variability is expected. On the other 
hand. in order to be of empirical value, measures must show an 
adequate degree of uniqueness . 
Therefore, it is essential that each measure has a proximate 
conceptual relationship to (while also maintaining adequate 
distinction from) Eriksonian stage theory. By utilizing separate and 
somewhat distinct measures it is expected that global correlations 
between psychosocial measures and developmental stages are 
minimized-thereby reducing the likelihood of systematic variance 
associated with a particular measure (Caillet & Michael. 1983). 
The Extended Objective Measure 
of Ego Identity Status 
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The original Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (Adams et 
al., 1979) was developed not only as a less costly alternative to 
Marcia's measure (which established a subject's ideological identity 
status via in-person interviews). but as a means to assess shifts in a 
subjects thinking on Marcia's three content domains (Adams et al., 
1987b). Later, in an attempt to address additional Eriksonian facets of 
identity. the EOM -EIS-1 incorporated interpersonal aspects such as 
friendship , dating, sex roles. and recreation (Grotevant & Adams, 
1984) . The current version, the EOM-EIS-2 (Bennion & Adams. 
1986). consists of 64 questions scored on a 1-6 Likert scale. The 
questions measure eight identity status subscales (viz .. politics. 
philosophy, religion. dating, recreation. friendship. sex roles. and 
dating) comprised of interpersonal and ideological aspects for each of 
the four identity statuses. 
To be categorized into an identity status, scores on the subscales 
must be at least one standard deviation above the group mean on 
one-and only one-of the four status distributions. Persons scoring 
above one standard deviation from the mean on multiple scales are 
considered in transition and are not categorized into a pure status. 
Persons whose scores fall one standard deviation below the mean 
cutoff on more than one distribution are also traditionally not 
categorized into a pure status. 
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A recent study has looked at the effect of lowering the minimum 
level for categorizing to .50 of a standard deviation (Jones, Akers, & 
White, 1993). Such a technique provides comparable findings while 
increasing pure classifications from 33% to about 42%. In order to 
maximize the percentage of categorizable subjects in a sample, this 
study utilizes the Jones et al. (1993) method. 
Evidence of construct validity using correlations with six 
theoretically unrelated constructs (e.g., verbal ability and academic 
achievement) ranged from -.25 to .22. accounting for only 6.25% of 
the variance (Grotevant & Adams, 1984). Test-retest correlations for 
stability (over a 4-week period of time) ranged from .59 to .82 
(Grotevant & Adams. 1984). Reliability estimates for subscales 
(intemal consistency) from 13 studies using the EOM-EIS-2 ranged 
from .30 to .89, with a median alpha of .66 (Adams et al., 1987b). A 
3- year. longitudinal study by Streitmatter (1993) utilizing the EOM-
EIS found no significant differences between males and females on 
identity development. Overall. the review of Adams et al. (1987b) 
yields evidence of high reliability and concurrent validity for the EOM-
EIS. A study by Jones and Streitmatter (1987) on the validity and 
reliability of the EOM-EIS concurred that the measure is an 
appropriate tool for assessing identity development in adolescent 
samples. 
49 
The Eriksonian Psychosocial Stag:e Inventory 
Only a handful of measures has attempted to assess several 
stages/levels of psychosocial development. None have shown 
multifactorial construct validity-a primary reason for using additional 
(separate) instruments for each Eriksonian stage in this study. 
The Eriksonian Personality Scale Inventory (EPSI) was designed 
to measure Erikson's first six stages among late adolescents-primarily 
college students (Rosenthal et al .. 1981) . It is a self-administered 
questionnaire consisting of 12 Likert questions for each of the flrst six 
syntonic psychosocial stage traits. 
Estimates of internal consistency range from . 73 on the Intimacy 
subscale to .81 on the Initiative subscale. Jones and Anderson (1993) 
have shown evidence of a moderate degree of shared variation between 
EPSI subscales when administered to children and pre-adolescents-
ranging from r = .46 (autonomy with industry) to r = .69 (autonomy 
with identity) . Overall. the shared variability between scales averages 
29.3%. EPSI subscales, therefore. average over 70% unique variability, 
"thus justifying their utility to assess distinct psychosocial character-
istics associated with unique .. . stages of development" (Jones, & 
Anderson. 1993. p. 8) for children. 
However, Eriksonian measures administered to older 
adolescents and adults have yet to clearly establish the uniqueness of 
one stage from another. A factor analysis on the EPSI showed that 
items for all six subscales loaded on only two factors during late 
50 
adolescence: labeled trust and autonomy (Gray. !spa. & Thornburg, 
1986) . Logan (1986) also found two factors-which he titled existential 
and instrumental-and suggested that Erikson's first three stages are 
essentially repeated in a more sophisticated way during the second 
three stages. A factor analysis using multiple measures (not including 
the EPSI) purporting to tap Eriksonian stages also found a lack of 
construct uniqueness across all of the first four stage subscales (Caillet 
& Michael. 1983). Rather than tapping unique psychosocial stages. 
these developmental measures may simply be assessing ·a global 
construct unique to that particular test" (Caillet & Michael, 1983. p. 
206) . Therefore. it is not known whether Erikson's theory is 
inaccurate in the claim that distinctive stages function throughout the 
Ufe-span or whether "Eriksonian" measures have yet to tap or 
distinguish the stages . 
While the question of shared variance is potentially problematic. 
the EPSI appears to be the most appropriate measure available to 
assess the various Eriksonian stages . Additionally, the following stage-
related measures should aid in illuminating the differences between 
the first four psychosocial stages . 
Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale 
As preViously mentioned. Erikson 's psychosocial notions of basic 
trust as a central element of a healthy personality are found in evolVing 
forms throughout the life-span. Rotter's conceptualization of trust 
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differs somewhat from Erikson's. Rotter (1967) defined trust as a 
generalized expectancy that the word. promise. or statement of an 
indiVidual or group can be relied upon . Still. the fundamental elements 
for defining trust appear to be quite similar in many regards for both 
Viewpoints. Both attempt to capture the degree to which an indiVidual 
believes. has expectation toward. and/or relies upon others 
(particularly parents or other authority figures) based upon past 
interpersonal experiences. 
The Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (IT) is particularly relevant 
to this study as it was developed specifically for late-adolescent 
subjects. Numerous studies have proVided eVidence of construct 
validity for the IT scale (see Robinson. Shaver, & Wrightsman. 1991) . 
Factor analysis reveals the presence of two factors: trust of family 
agents and peers , and trust in institutions and political authority. 
The IT was developed in the mid -1960s and continues to rank 
as one of the foremost self-administered measures of trust. In its 
current form the scale consists of 25 Likert response items. The 
psychometric properties of the IT scale were addressed between 
1964 and 1969 with a sample of 4,605 undergraduate students 
(Hochreich & Rotter. 1970). Split-half reliability for the IT scale was 
. 76. Test-retest reliability. across an average of 3 months, was .68 (n = 
42). Analysis of variance showed no significant differences by age. 
gender. or number of semesters in college. Modest. but significant, 
positive relationships did exist with religion and SES. 
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Construct validity was determined through comparisons to the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
and to seven sociometric ratings (which included dependency, trust, 
gullibility, trustworthiness. popularity. friendship, and self-report of 
trust) . The correlation between the IT and the sociometric trust score 
produced a correlation of .37. Almost all other correlations were in 
the expected direction (ranging from .23 to .55). There was no 
relationship between the IT and gullibility. and a negative relationship 
was found between the IT and dependency (r = -.23). Trusting 
individuals saw themselves as less dependent upon others . This is 
consistent with the Eriksonian position that trust is a necessary 
prerequisite to autonomy. 
Emotional Autonomy Scale 
The theoretical conception of autonomy is not new: however, 
empirical operationalizing of the term has yet to secure consensus 
among theorists and researchers. Perhaps this is due in part to the 
fact that the various phenomena from which autonomy issues seem 
inextricably related are many. Autonomy has been characterized 
variously as a sense of detachment. the outcome of individuation, 
resistance to peer or parental pressure , a sense of independence, self-
confidence in decision making, and so forth (Steinberg & Silverberg, 
1986) . 
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While it is not vital that every possible parameter of autonomy is 
present in a measure of autonomy, it seems reasonable that such a 
measure tap the broad issues related to psychosocial development, 
and, in particular, the issues of autonomy as they relate to 
adolescence . The Steinberg Emotional Autonomy Scale (EA) was 
originally designed to assess. in early adolescents, prominent aspects 
of psychosocial development. The measure has been used in studies of 
late adolescents as well. Indeed, a validity study concluded that the EA 
scale is probably "more salient to college students. who are, in fact. 
away from home and experiencing more pressure toward self-
reliance" (Ryan & Lynch, 1989, p. 354) and related autonomy issues. 
The EA scale consists of 20 Likert Items. A validation study was 
conducted with 865 adolescents ranging in age from 10-16 (Steinberg 
& Silverberg, 1986) . Factor analysis revealed four factors, entitled : 
perceives parents as people (six items. alpha = .61). parental 
deidealization (five items. alpha = .63). nondependency on parents 
(four items. alpha= .51). and individuation (five items, alpha= .60). A 
three-way ANOVA was performed regarding age, gender, and SES. The 
strongest statistical difference was the positive. linear, upward 
relationship of autonomy to age . No SES differences were found. 
Gender differences were less strong, with girls scoring higher 
overall than boys. This finding generally is contradictory to the 
findings of other studies. However, Steinberg & Silverberg (1986) 
dismissed the incongruity with the suggestion that boys may report 
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more accurately about the salience of autonomy than about the 
manifestation of autonomous behavior "precisely because boys have so 
much trouble establishing autonomy in a genuine and real sense" 
(1986. p . 849). Secondly. Steinberg and Silverberg (1986) suggested 
that theory and findings in the 1950s and 1960s about sex differences 
may need revision in that: 
.. .it may have been true that girls' concerns revolved 
around issues of intimacy and boys' around autonomy. But 
It is time that we reconsidered this proposition: women's 
roles have changed and so. probably, have the psycholog-
ical concerns and capabilities of adolescent girls. (p . 849) 
Indeed, Steinberg and Silverberg (1986) pointed out that 
different autonomy issues are salient at different times according to 
gender. Markstrom-Adams (1989) furthered the point by stating that 
"it is unrealistic to assume that sex role orientations are so pervasive 
as to be related to all aspects of psychosocial well-being" (p. 339). 
Still. in general. gender comparisons most often find no differences in 
autonomy. or differences with boys scoring higher (Markstrom-Adams. 
1989). 
Further construct validity of the EA was determined through 
cross-measure comparisons to several related measures such as 
Berndt's Resistance to Peer Pressure measure. and the Self-Reliance 
Subscale of the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory (Steinberg & 
Silverberg. 1986). Many of the relationships between measures were 
negligible . For example, girls' feelings of autonomy were directly 
related to self-reliance. There was no such relationship for boys. Age 
55 
also intervened heavily; the more an early adolescent reports 
autonomy from parents the less he or she is likely to report feelings of 
self-reliance. and is least able to resist peer pressure. This is 
consistent with the Eriksonian perspective that excessive levels 
(positive or negative) of autonomy are less favorable to development 
than are balanced levels. 
Initiative/Guilt Subscales of the 
Ego Stage Development Inventory 
Because no specific measure has been developed which taps 
equivalent Eriksonian notions of initiative. it is necessary to use a 
subscale from a general psychosocial measure. Like the EPSI. the Ego 
Stage Development Inventory (ESDI) (Caillet. 1980) was designed to 
address both syntonic and dystonic aspects of Erikson's first six stages 
of development. Therefore. both the Initiative and the Guilt subscales 
will be employed in this study. 
Methodological procedures taken in the development of the 
ESDI Initiative/Guilt subscale (see Caillet & Michael. 1983) are: 
l. Operational definitions were created for Eriksonian stage 
three constructs-initiative and guilt. 
2. An instrument was designed to tap personal perceptions 
across a universe of items of stage three development. 
3 . Eighteen items representing initiative resolution and 18 
items representing guilt resolution were created from the operational 
definitions 
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4. The 36 stage three items were submitted to two judges for 
the verification of content validity. Both judges had to agree that an 
item represented both the initiative stage and the syntonic/dystonic 
valence to which it applied. Additionally. both judges had to agree that 
the item was not written ambiguously. 
5. Initiative/guilt questions (along with questions pertaining to 
each of Erikson 's first six psychosocial s tages) were presented to 22 
high school students of various reading levels. Any item identified as 
ambiguous by two or more students was eliminated. 
6. Remaining initiative/guilt items were tested using 74 under-
graduate students of California State University, Long Beach. 
Based on extensive item and factor analysis. 12 initiative and 12 
guilt items were retained in the final version of the measure . The 
Initiative/Guilt subscale of the ESDI appears to be an adequate 
measure of initiative for the purposes of this study. 
The Self-Efficacy Scale 
Although Kowaz and Marcia (1991) have recently developed an 
industry instrument for children. no specific industry measure exists 
which is applicable to an adolescent or college-age sample. Without a 
specifically analogous measure. one must be selected which 
corresponds as closely as possible to Eriksonian notions of the 
industry versus inferiority stage. Industry. according to Erikson 
(1968) , is a sense of being useful. " ... a sense of being able to make 
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things and make them well and even perfectly ... " (p. 123). To have 
industry is to have a sense of competent mastery and ability to 
persevere (Erikson, 1982). Industry involves doing things well beside 
and with others and becomes the basis for cooperative participation 
(Erikson et al., 1986). It is a balanced tendency toward industri-
ousness and accomplishment over inferiority and ineptness. 
Kowaz and Marcia (1991) have noted that Bandura's concept of 
self-efficacy bears resemblance to the concept of industry. Self-efficacy 
is a person's belief that he/she can successfully perform a given task or 
behaVior. Bandura (1977) refers to this quality as personal mastery or 
personal competence. Furthermore. self-efficacy determines the 
degree of effort performed on a task and the level of "persistence In 
the face of adversity" (Sherer e t al .. 1982. p. 663). Therefore. it seems 
reasonable that self-efficacy may be conceptually related to Eriksonian 
notions of industry. 
The Self-Efficacy Scale (SE) (Sherer et al. , 1982) was developed 
to measure such attributes in college-age indiViduals . The original 
reliability/validity testing was conducted on a sample of 674 college 
undergraduate students. Factor analysis resulted in the SE loading 23 
Likert scale items on two factors: general self-efficacy and social self-
efficacy, and yielded Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients of .86 and 
. 71, respectively. 
To assess construct validity, the SE was correlated with seven 
related personality instruments. All predicted correlations were 
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moderate and in the appropriate direction-the highest with a general 
measure of interpersonal competency (r = .45) . This is of particular 
interest because the interpersonal competency scale is a measure of 
psychological adjustment regarding personal effectiveness and ability 
to deal with others-traits highly related to Erikson's notion of 
industry. For these reasons , the Self-Efficacy Scale appears to be an 
appropriate industry stage measure. 
Data Collection and Sampling 
Inasmuch as only 70% of a sample may not be categorized in an 
identity status on the EOM-EIS-2, a relatively large sample size of 414 
was collected to ensure at least 25 subjects in each identity status. The 
EOM-EIS-2. EPSI, and separate stage measures were offered 
(randomly mixed . with no filler questions) to approximately 500 
university students in introductory psychology courses at Utah State 
University during Winter Quarter 1992. 
Of 414 respondents 92% were Caucasian and between the ages 
18-24 (36% age 19) . Sixty-two percent of the respondents were 
female: 38% were male. Fifty-six percent reported themselves as 
freshmen , 24% as sophomores. and 15% as juniors. Eighty-six percent 
were single or never married : 11 % were currently married . Because 
the measures purport to tap universal identity, personality or 
psychosocial traits. other demographic and SES type factors were not 
collected. The analysis included only those respondents between the 
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age of 18-24. totalling 387 subjects: this was further reduced to only 
those categorizeable into an identity status (n= 129). 
All survey items were presented on a 1-6 Likert scale. Overall, 
the subjects comprised a rather homogenous group-a factor which 
should increase internal validity of the findings, albeit while 
jeopardizing external validity. 
The readability level of each measure was examined according to 
the Lix scale (Anderson. 1983)-1 = first grade to 13 = college level: 
EOM-EIS-11: 
EPSI: 
Rotter Trust: 
6 
3 
6 
Steinberg Autonomy: 
Caillet ESDI: 
Sherer Self-Efficacy: 
These readability levels appear appropriate to a low-stress 
environment important to psychologically oriented, self-report 
assessment. Because data were collected anonymously and 
unobtrusively, no ethical or harmful implications were expected. 
Analysis 
5 
5 
4 
Following data collection, identity statuses and psychosocial 
levels were generated. Respondents whose scores fit. by definition, 
into an identity status constituted the sample for this study (n=130). 
Due to the theoretical assumption that appropriate resolution of 
previous Eriksonian psychosocial stages is a prerequisite to (and, 
hence. predictor oO healthy ego identity development. psychosocial 
measures (e.g .. trust, autonomy, initiative. industry) are construed as 
independent variables with identity status as the dependent variable. 
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Furthermore, because the independent variables provide interval data 
and the dependent measure provides categorical data, the most 
appropriate statistical procedure is discriminant analysis . Discriminant 
analysis is a procedure for identifying relationships between 
quantitative predictor variables and qualitative criterion variables 
(Kachigan, 1982). In this case. the EPSI and specific stage measures 
were used to establish the relationships between psychosocial stages 
and identity status. Additionally. the discriminant analysis served to 
clarify the boundaries between identity statuses. 
Specifically, by using the separate measures and EPSI subscale 
scores as the predictor (independent) variables, discriminant analysis 
was performed to examine psychosocial differences between each of 
the identity statuses (e.g .. achieved versus moratorium, achieved 
versus foreclosed, etc .)-totalling six separate research hypotheses. 
Finally. discriminant analysis was performed to examine psychosocial 
differences between the identity statuses collectively. These 
relationships serve to empirically clarify the theoretical connections 
between Marcia's identity status model and E1ikson's theory of 
psychosocial development. 
CHAPTER rv 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
This chapter will address (a) reliability and validity estimates 
generated for each scale/subscale. (b) results from testing the 
hypotheses , and (c) conclusions of the results. 
Reliability and Validity 
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In order to assess the internal consistencies of each 
scale/subscale used in this study. estimates of reliability (Cronbach 
alpha) were established. Reliabilities (Table 5) for the EOM-EIS-2. 
EPSI. and separate stage scales and subscales were similar to findings 
reported in previous studies (see Chapter Ill) . 
Regarding the internal consistency of the EOM-EIS. reliability 
estimates ranged from .70 to .87. Subscale reliabilities from 13 
previous studies using the EOM-EIS-2 ranged from .30 to .89, with a 
median alpha of .66 (Adams et al .. 1987b). Of interest is the unusually 
high . 73 alpha on the diffusion subscale. which in other studies is 
frequently nearer .50 to .60. 
Estimates of reliability for the EPSI subscales were Trust . 71, 
Autonomy .78. Initiative .72. and Industry .81. In each case, subscale 
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Table 5 
Reliability Estimates of Measures 
EOM-EIS-II Subscale Reliabilities 
Subscal~ Items Mean Std. Dev. Alpha 
Achieved 16 69.8 9.4 .70 
Moratorium 16 48.8 10.0 .75 
Foreclosed 16 41.2 12.8 .87 
Diffused 16 41.9 9.9 .73 
EPSI Subscale Reliabilities 
S]Jbscale Items Mean Std. Dev. Alpha 
Trust 12 49.3 7.5 .71 
Autonomy 12 54.9 7 .9 .78 
Initiative 12 52.7 7.3 .72 
Industry 12 54. 1 8 .0 .81 
Separate Sta~e Measure Scale Reliabilities 
Subscale Items Mean Std. Dev. Alpha 
Trust (Rotter) 25 79.0 11.2 .75 
Autonomy (Steinberg) 20 73.0 12.7 .82 
Initiative (Caillet) 12 51.0 8 .4 .83 
Low Guilt (Caillet) 12 48.2 9.1 .80 
Industry (Sherer) 23 96.8 8 .0 .89 
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reliabilities were higher than those reported in the original study (.63 . 
. 62, .57, and .75, respectively: Rosenthal eta!.. 1981). 
The reliability estimate of the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale 
study of . 71 is comparable to previous findings. Previous studies 
estimated split-half reliability at . 76 and test-retest reliability, across 
an average of 3 months. at .68 (Hochreich & Rotter, 1970). 
The Emotional Autonomy Scale reliability estimate from this 
sample was .82. The Cronbach alpha detennined in the original study 
was slightly lower at .75 (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). 
Caillet and Michael (1983) reported original subscale estimates 
of reliability of the Ego Stage Development Inventory ranging from .68 
to .90. The estimates of reliability for the Initiative and Guilt subscales 
for this study of .83 and .80 .. respectively. fall within that range. 
The reliability estimate of the Self-Efficacy Scale in this study 
was .89. This estimate is greater than the . 79 alpha determined in the 
original study (Sherer et al.. 1982) . 
The reliability estimates of the EOM-EIS and EPSI subscales and 
of the separate stage measures-all being equal to or greater than 
estimates of previous studies-indicate that the measures have a 
favorable degree of intemal consistency. Furthermore. all reliability 
estimates were well over the .60 alpha level recommended by 
Nunnally (1978) for scales to be used in basic psychometric research. 
For these reasons. selected measures appear to be adequate for use in 
this study. 
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In order to determine discriminant/convergent relations among 
the scales and construct validity of the subscales, Pearson correlation 
coefficients were generated for the EOM-EIS-2 and EPSI subscales 
and for each of the separate measures (Table 6). Of particular interest 
is the degree of shared variability within similar measures. Regarding 
the EOM-EIS-2 subscales (a) the achieved and foreclosure scales 
showed a modest positive correlation (.15), (b) the achieved and 
moratorium scales exhibited a modest negative correlation (-.11). 
(c) the achieved and diffused scales were negatively correlated (-.29), 
and (d) the moratorium and diffusion scales had a moderate positive 
correlation (.49). These correlations are consistent with results from 
previous studies (Adams et a!., 1987b). 
Pearson correlations of the EPSI subscales (Trust, Autonomy, 
Initiative, and Industry) ranged from .60 to . 75, indicating a 
moderately high relationship between subscales. The degree of shared 
variance (r2) , therefore. ranged from .36 (Trust with Initiative) to .56 
(Autonomy with Initiative). While it is theoretically relevant that the 
EPSI subscales are positively correlated, Pearson correlations confirm 
the expectation that a significant degree of variance in each subscale 
may be shared. This adds credence to Caillet's and Michael's (1983) 
assertion that some Eriksonian measures tend to tap global, rather 
than stage specific, aspects of psychosocial development. This justifies 
the deployment of separate measures for each stage in this study. 
Table6 
Scale/Subscale Correlation Coefficients 
Achleveg 
Moratorium -. II MQratQr!ym 
Foreclosed .15 -.00 [Qn;~;lQ~d 
(_~ DUTused -.29 .49 .04 DiJTusecl Trust .02 -.16 .13 -.15 Trust 
Autonomy -. 16 .22 -.45 .20 -.20 t,u(QnQ!lli 
Detachment -. 15 .34 -. 15 .30 -. 15 .82 D!:ta~:hm~:nl 
Independence -. 12 .04 -.60 .05 -. 19 .80 .31 lng~geng; 
Initiative .37 .05 .04 -.25 .07 -.06 -.01 -.07 Inllla llv!: 
Low Guilt .14 -.28 -. 10 -.35 . 19 -.21 -.25 -.00 .43 ~ 
Industry .20 -.20 -. 10 -.37 .16 -. 15 -.24 .03 .52 .69 
.!illl!!m 
EPSI Trust .25 -.29 .04 -.35 .32 -.27 -.34 -.00 .24 .49 .55 EPS!Trus! 
EPSI Autonomy .26 -.25 -.10 -.36 .14 -.20 -.30 .01 .35 .56 .68 (§! EPSI Autonomy 
EPSI lnllallve .22 -.22 -.17 -.37 .08 -.13 -.22 .00 .51 .61 .70 .00 .74 EP:;2I lnl!lallvt 
EPSI Industry .20 -.28 -.03 -.36 . II -.18 -.28 .00 .30 .49 .00 .62 .72 .66 
Ifr = .10 . . 11 , or . 12. then p< .05. 
Ifr> .12. thenp< .01. 
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The Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter. 1967) correlated In the 
expected direction with every scale/subscale. Appropriately, the 
highest Interpersonal Trust correlation (.32) was with the EPSI Trust 
subscale. Still, the 90% uniqueness (1"2 = .10) between the two scales 
insures that a greater measurement domain will be tapped. The next 
highest Interpersonal Trust correlation was with the Emotional 
Autonomy Scale (-.20). The modest positive correlation (.12) of the 
Trust measure to the EPSl Autonomy subscale places the EPSI and 
Emotional Autonomy measures potentially at odds with each other. 
The Emotional Autonomy (EA) measure had a negative 
correlation (-.16) with the EPSI Autonomy subscale. Additionally. the 
EA scale correlated negatively (-.06 to -.27) with all other EPSI 
subscales and separate stage measures. The small amount of shared 
variance (1"2 = . 000 l to . 08) between the EPSI and separate stage 
measures indicates the possibility that the EA is measuring a 
somewhat different form(s) of autonomy. Regarding this variation. 
Ryan and Lynch (1989) stated that: 
Our major concern .. .is not with the measure of EA per se. but 
its interpretation as a form of autonomy. Neither the 
evidence presented here nor that presented by Steinberg 
and Silverberg supports the premise that EA is a marker of 
self-regulation or self-reliance. Instead. it appears that EA Is 
most meaningfully construed as emotional detachment. .. 
Viewed as a measure of detachment. however. the EA 
measure helps illuminate significant issues in the area of 
adolescent development. (p . 354) 
Ryan and Lynch (1989) suggested that certain types of autonomy may 
be developmentally appropriate and others inappropriate. For 
example. adolescents who are autonomously detached from parents 
and others may develop a more negative self-view. 
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Somewhat ameliorating the discrepancy between the EA and the 
EPSl Autonomy subscale. the EA scale/subscales correlated positively 
with moratorium and diffusion scores and negatively with the 
achievement and foreclosure scores. supporting, conceptually. the 
appropriate direction of the EA measure. In that Erikson's theory 
presumes balance and avoidance of extremes, the EA scale may. in 
part. measure extreme autonomy-that which approaches the notion of 
shameless willfulness. 
A factor analysis of the EA and the EPSI Autonomy subscale 
identified three factors (Appendix G). All EPSI Autonomy items (and 
no EA items) loaded on one factor. The other two factors consisted of 
all of the EA items. When correlated to the other measures. one factor 
(titled Detachment) had broader and more pronounced negative 
correlations to the EPSI and separate stage measures than the EA as a 
whole. Detachment appears to be a type of unhealthy autonomy or 
alienation. The other factor (titled Independence) appears to assess a 
somewhat less negative component of autonomy as correlations with 
the other psychosocial measures are mixed. In order to address these 
differing dimensions of autonomy. the EA and its two factor-generated 
subscales (viz .. Detachment & Independence) were used with the 
EPSI Autonomy subscale in the discriminant analysis. 
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The Initiative and Guilt subscales of the Ego Stage Development 
Inventory correlated moderately (.51 & .61 .. respectively) with the 
EPSI Initiative subscale. They also correlated positively (.07 to .68) 
with the remaining scales/subscales-Emotional Autonomy scale/ 
subscales excepted. The same pattern of correlations (.16 to . 70) was 
found for the separate measure of Industry (Self-Efficacy Scale) . The 
Industry measure correlation to the EPSI Industry was .69. indicating 
a uniqueness of nearly 50%. 
Overall. discriminant/convergent relations support the use of 
the measures in this study. The one unexpected result was the broadly 
negative-but modest-correlations of the Emotional Autonomy Scale. 
The overall degree of shared variability among scales/subscales In this 
study was relatively small. It is therefore expected that the measures 
tap generally corresponding. yet sufficiently unique. domains to be 
valid measures of adolescent psychosocial development. 
Testing of the Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship 
between Marcia's ego identity status model and Erikson's psychosocial 
theory. Choosing the appropriate statistical tool for the study required 
taking into consideration the notion that identity development is 
presumed to be dependent upon the development of previous 
psychosocial stages-hence identity status was the dependent variable 
and psychosocial stages were the independent variables. Statistical 
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comparison of categorical dependent variables with continuous 
independent variables requires the use of discriminant analysis. 
Null hypothesis 1. The achieved status will not differ from 
moratorium status on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative, and 
industry. Discriminant analysis was performed to compare psycho-
social differences of the achieved and moratorium respondents . 
Results showed that persons in the achieved status differed from 
moratorium status respondents on measures related to all of the first 
four psychosocial stages (Table 7). 
Table 7 
Discriminant Analysis Summa ry Table: Achieved with Moratorium 
Achieved Moratorium Wilks' 
Scale LSubscale Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Lambda fug. 
EPSI Trust 53.58 5 .75 45.85 6.51 .72 .00 
Detachment 31.88 7 .90 38.58 7 .00 .67 .00 
Low Guilt 52. 14 8.34 45.12 7.62 .64 .00 
Industry 103.37 11.13 96 .35 16.01 .62 .00 
Initiative 53.98 6 .74 49.88 6.91 .60 .00 
EPSI Industry 57.33 6.56 52 .54 7.70 .58 .00 
Group Centroids: Achieved 0 .66 Moratorium -1.09 
Number of cases by group Canonical carr.= .65 
Achieved 43 Chi Square = 35.61 
Moratorium 26 Sig. level .000 
Total 69 Lambda= .57 
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Achieved respondents report 18.10% higher levels on the EPSI 
Trust subscale than moratoriums. Moratoriums reported 17.36% 
higher levels on the EA Detachment subscale (related to negative 
psychosocial development) than achieved. Achieved respondents 
reported 13.46% higher levels on the Low Guilt subscale. The 
achieved reported 6. 79% higher levels on the Industry measure, 
7 .67% higher on the Initiative measure, and 8.42% higher levels on 
the EPSI Industry subscale than the moratoriums. 
The resulting function accounted for 42 .23% of the variability, 
and a classification accuracy of 84.06%. Overall, the achieved identity 
status was related to higher levels than the moratorium status on all of 
the first four Eriksonian stages of psychosocial development. The null 
hypothesis was therefore rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 . The achieved status will not differ from foreclosed 
status on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative. and industry. 
Discriminant analysis found two predominant psychosocial differences 
among the achieved and foreclosed respondents (Table 8) . 
Achieved respondents reported 11.29% higher levels on the EA 
Independence subscale, while foreclosed respondents reported 7.27% 
lower levels on the Industry scale. However. because of the moderate 
canonical correlation (.50. accounting for only 25% of the 
variability) and because of the relative accuracy (65.82%) in classifYing 
achieved versus foreclosed respondents, the extent of the differences 
between the two statuses is not as clearly evident as those between 
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Table 8 
Discriminant Analysis Summary Table: Achieved with Foreclosed 
Achieved Foreclosed Wilks' 
S!;aleLSubscale Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Lambda ~ 
Independence 43.72 6.64 38.83 5.51 .86 .00 
Industry 103.37 11.13 95.86 13.27 .80 .00 
Autonomy 71.23 12 .01 68 .31 7.88 .77 .00 
Initiative 53.98 6.74 50.31 8.22 .76 .00 
EPSI Trust 53.59 5 .75 49.67 7.77 .76 .00 
Group Centroids: Achieved 0 .51 Foreclosed -0.61 
Number of cases per group Canonical Corr. = .50 
Achieved 43 Chi Square = 21.08 
Foreclosed 36 Sig. Level = .000 
Total 79 Lambda= .76 
other statuses (e .g .. achieved versus moratorium, achieved versus 
diffused), and resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis . 
Hypothesis 3 . The achieved status will not differ from diffused 
status on measures of trust. autonomy. initiative, and industry. 
Discriminant analysis found numerous. broad psychosocial differences 
between achieved and diffused persons (Table 9) . thereby rejecting 
the null hypothessis. 
The function produced in the analysis accounts for over half of 
the variability between the statuses (r2 = .56) and an overall Lambda of 
.43. This results in an impressive classification accuracy of 91.04%. 
The most significant psychosocial difference between achieved 
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Table 9 
Discriminant Analysis Summary Table: Achieved with Diffused 
Achieved Diffused Wilks' 
S!:;al!:LSub~H.;ale Mean Std. D!:v. Mean Std. Dev. Lambda §!g. 
Initiative 53.98 6 .74 41.88 7 .07 .58 .00 
EPSI Trust 53.59 5 .75 45.67 7.91 .50 .00 
Detachment 31.88 7.90 36.46 5.93 .48 .00 
EPSI Autonomy 54.91 6.52 45.38 7.87 .45 .00 
Trust 80.51 9.90 74.63 10.52 .44 .00 
Low Guilt 52.14 8.34 44.63 8.40 .43 .00 
Group Centroids: Achieved .84 Diffused -1.51 
Number of cases per group Canonical Corr. = . 75 
Achieved 43 Chi Square = 52.22 
Diffused 24 Sig. Level = .000 
Total 67 Lambda= .43 
and diffused respondents was on the Initiative scale (Lambda= .58). 
with achieved respondents reporting levels 22.41% higher. The 
achieved also scored 14.73% higher on EPSI Trust and 7.36% 
higher on the Trust scale. Diffused persons, on the other hand, 
reported 14.42% higher levels on the Guilt subscale, and 12.59% 
higher levels of EA Detachment subscale. 
Hypothesis 4 . The moratorium status will not differ from 
foreclosed status on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative, and 
industry. The discriminant funct ion created from the analysis showed, 
as expected, that moratoriums reported significantly higher levels 
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(11.50%) on the Emotional Autonomy Scale (being higher on both the 
Detachment and Independence subscales) than foreclosed respond-
ents (Table 10). Foreclosed persons scored slightly (3 .84%) higher 
than moratoriums on the EPSI Initiative subscale, as well as on both 
the EPSI Trust subscale and Trust measure. 8.27% and 7.85%, 
respectively. This discriminant function accounts for 30.26% of the 
variance between the two statuses. and produces a 72.58% classifi-
cation accuracy. Although differences in initiative and trust may be 
relevant. the primary psychosocial difference between moratorium and 
foreclosed respondents appeared in various aspects of autonomy. 
Based on the findings, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Table 10 
Discriminant Analysis Summa ry Table: Mora torium with Foreclosed 
Moratorium Foreclosed Wilks' 
ScaleLSubscale Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Lambda ~ 
Autonomy 77.19 12.17 68.31 7 .88 .83 .00 
EPSI Trust 45.85 6 .51 49.67 7.77 .77 .00 
EPSI Autonomy 49.58 6.91 50.33 7.78 .76 .00 
EPSI Initiative 51.15 7.99 53.11 5.76 .72 .00 
Trust 73.38 11.01 79.56 10.49 .69 .00 
Group Centroids: Moratorium .77 Foreclosed -0.56 
Number of cases per group Canonical Corr. = .55 
Moratorium 26 Chi Square = 21.00 
Foreclosed 36 Sig. Level= .000 
Total 62 Lambda= .69 
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Hypothesis 5 . The moratorium status will not differ from 
diffused status on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative. and industry. 
The major difference between moratorium and diffused respondents 
was that moratoriums reported 16.04% higher levels on the Initiative 
measure (Table 11) . Diffused persons reported 8 .57% higher levels on 
the EPSI Autonomy subscale than moratoriums. 
The amount of variability between the two statuses explained by 
the discriminant function is 38.44%. with a classification accuracy of 
76.00%. In general, while issues of autonomy are notable, the 
moratorium status differs most from the diffused status on the fourth 
Eriksonian stage-initiative. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected . 
Table 11 
Discriminant Ana lysis Summary Table: Moratorium with Diffused 
Moratorium Diffused Wilks' 
S!,;alr;:LSubscale Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std . Dev. Lambda ~ 
Initiative 49.88 6.91 41.88 7 .07 .75 .00 
Low Guilt 45.12 7 .62 44.63 8.40 .69 .00 
EPSI Autonomy 49.58 8 .21 45.38 7.88 .65 .00 
Independence 43.50 7.60 45.25 7 .50 .63 .00 
Group Centroids: Moratorium 0.73 Diffused -0.79 
Number of cases per group Canonical Corr. = .62 
Moratorium 26 Chi Square = 21.60 
Diffused 24 Sig. Level = .000 
Total 50 Lambda= .63 
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Hypothesis 6 . The foreclosed status will not differ from the 
diffused status on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
Two significant differences constitute the discriminant function of the 
analysis (Table 12). 
Foreclosed persons reported 16.82% higher levels on the 
Initiative measure. Diffused persons reported higher levels (11.66%) 
on the Emotional Autonomy scale. Classification accuracy was 80.00%, 
and the canonical correlation accounted for 42.33% of the variability. 
The findings result in rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Table 12 
Discriminant Analysis Summary Table: Foreclosed with Diffused 
Foreclosed 
Scale/Subscale Mean Std. Dev. 
Initiative 50.31 8.22 
Autonomy 68.31 7.88 
Group Centroids: Foreclosed .59 
Number of cases per group 
Foreclosed 
Diffused 
Total 
36 
24 
60 
Diffused Wilks' 
Mean Std. Dev. Lambda 
41.88 7 .07 .77 
77.25 9 .79 .65 
Diffused -0.89 
Canonical Corr. = .65 
Chi Square= 24.92 
Sig. Level = .000 
Lambda= .65 
~ 
.00 
.00 
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Conclusions 
In summary, analyses illustrate numerous, specific. significant 
differences between Marcia's identity statuses and Erikson's first four 
psychosocial stages. Each of the six null hypotheses (that there were 
no differences between identity statuses) was rejected. In general, the 
identity status with the highest levels of EPSI Trust. EPSI Autonomy, 
EPSI Initiative, and EPSI Industry was the achieved status-followed by 
the foreclosed. moratorium. and diffusion statuses .. respectively 
(Appendix H). This pattern also held true for the separate measures of 
trust. initiative, and industry-excepting that moratoriums scored 
slightly higher than foreclosed respondents on the measure of 
industry. 
TI1e View of the Emotional Autonomy scale, particularly the 
Detachment subscale, as a form of unhealthy psychosocial development 
was substantiated. Interpretation of the domain addressed by the 
(subjectively titled) Independence subscale was less clear. Because of 
the lack of conceptual clarity, the relationship of the Independence 
subscale to either identity status or psychosocial development is of 
limited utility. 
Otherwise, the results generally provide quantitative eVidence 
that Marcia's model of ego identity development is related in a variety 
of ways to Erikson's first four psychosocial stages. The Implications of 
those relationships are discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This concluding chapter provides (a) a general summary of the 
study, (b) discussion. (c) limitations. and (d) recommendations for 
future research. 
Summary of the Study 
The concept of identity has been a focal point of human inquiry 
since antiquity. In the 20th century. theorists identified adolescence 
as a time vital to identity development. Erikson's psychosocial 
framework has become a predominant means to explain identity 
development throughout the lifespan . In recent years , Marcia's ego 
identity status paradigm was developed as a means to verifY Erikson's 
fifth psychosocial stage-identity versus role confusion (Marcia , 1966). 
Centering on notions of personal exploration and commitment, 
Marcia's paradigm has become a popular research method to 
quantitatively assess a variety of issues related to adolescent identity 
development (Bourne, 1978a). 
While the identity status paradigm has become the basis for 
nearly 200 studies on adolescent development. concerns have arisen 
which question the paradigm's adequacy. Cote and Levine (l988a) 
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have asserted that Marcia's model is too narrow in scope , limited in 
definition. and too rigid to address all (or most) of Erikson's notions of 
Identity development. Researchers and theorists have called for 
further research to verify and clarify differences and similarities of the 
two theories (see Adams. 1992) . The purpose of this study was to 
assess the relationship between Marcia's identity status paradigm and 
Erikson's psychosocial theory. 
A basic assumption of this study was that for the identity status 
model to be a valid representation of Erikson's fifth psychosocial 
stage, it must be consistent with the preceding four psychosocial 
stages (viz .. trust. autonomy, initiative. and industry) . Therefore, 
identity statuses were compared to measures of trust. autonomy, 
initiative, and Industry. 
The reserach questions used to test the research question were 
that: 
l . The achieved status will not differ from the moratorium status 
on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative. and industry. 
2. The achieved status will not differ from the foreclosed status 
on measures of trust. autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
3. The achieved status will not differ from the diffused status on 
measures of trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
4. The moratorium status will not differ from the foreclosed 
status on measures of trust. autonomy. initiative, and industry. 
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5. The moratorium status will not differ from the diffused status 
on measures of trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry. 
6. The foreclosed status will not differ from the diffused status 
on measures of trust, autonomy. initiative. and industry. 
Six self-report instruments were employed in this study. The 
Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status II (Bennion & 
Adams, 1986) was used as a basis to measure the dependent 
variable-identity status. The Eriksonian Psychosocial Stage Inventory 
(Rosenthal et al.. 1981) was used to measure each of the first four 
psychosocial stages. Additionally, separate instruments were employed 
to further measure aspects of trust (Interpersonal Trust Scale; Rotter, 
1967). a utonomy (Emotional Autonomy Scale; Steinberg & Silverberg, 
1986), initiative (Initiative/Guilt subscales of Ego Stage Development 
Inventory; Caillet. 1980). and industry (Self-Efficacy Scale; Sherer et 
al., 1982). The resulting survey consisted of 204 items. 
Nearly 500 students from two Utah State University introductory 
psychology classes were given the opportunity (outside of class time, 
for extra credit) to respond to the survey. Of these, 414 students 
participated in the study. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 
were used in the analysis, numbering 387. Respondents were 
predominantly freshmen. white, and unmarried: 62% were female, 
38% male. 
Reliability estimates of the measures, ranging from . 70 to .89, 
showed favorable internal consistencies for each measure. Pearson 
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correlations were moderate and positive for all measures except the 
Emotional Autonomy Scale. which was generally negatively correlated 
with the other measures. Therefore. a factor analysis was performed 
on the items in the Emotional Autonomy Scale and the EPSI Autonomy 
subscale. Three factors were identified and used as separate scales in 
the analysis. 
The Jones eta!. (1993) 1/2 standard deviation method was used 
to assign respondents to identity statuses-a sample totalling 129. Six 
discriminant analyses were performed (e.g., achieved with 
moratorium, achieved with foreclosed. etc.) with all psychosocial 
scales/subscales to determine specific psychosocial differences 
between statuses. 
A general pattem was found in this sample that the highest 
levels of psychosocial trust. autonomy. initiative. and industry were 
reported by the achieved respondents. followed by the foreclosed. 
moratoriums, and diffused. respectively. More importantly, 
discriminant analysis identified significant psychosocial differences 
between statuses. 
The achieved respondents reported higher levels of trust. 
autonomy, initiative. and industry than moratoriums; significantly 
higher levels of autonomy and industry than the foreclosed; and 
significantly higher levels of trust and initiative, and significantly lower 
levels of guilt when compared to diffused respondents. Moratoriums 
reported significantly higher levels of emotional autonomy and 
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significantly lower levels of trust and initiative than foreclosed 
respondents. Moratoriums did report significantly higher initiative and 
lower guilt than the diffused . Foreclosed respondents reported 
significantly higher initiative and lower autonomy than diffused 
persons . 
These results provide significant-albeit initial-quantitative 
evidence that Marcia's ego identity status paradigm corresponds both 
specifically and broadly to Eriksonian psychosocial theory. 
Discussion of the study 
Having established that Marcia's identity status paradigm is 
related to Erikson's portrayal of identity development, an 
interpretation of the findings, subtleties, and incongruities of the 
study is needed. 
The most compelling finding of this study was the confirmation 
that the achieved status was related to the highest levels of 
psychosocial adjustment on nearly every scale/subscale used in the 
study. This is consistent with the Owen (1984) study which found that 
achieved individuals scored highest on a general measure of 
psychological development. Previous studies found identity-achieved 
individuals to be Jess worried (Adams eta!., 1985) and have lower 
levels of self-consciousness (Adams et al. , 1987a) than individuals in 
other statuses. These findings are supported by the results of this 
study in that achieved persons reported significantly lower levels of 
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guilt than other respondents. Achieved persons have been found to be 
most content with working either alone or with others (Kroger. 
1990) . This is conceptually related to the findings of this study in that 
achieved persons had significantly higher levels of initiative and 
industry than other respondents . Previous studies also typically found 
persons in the achieved status to be generally superior in numerous 
other developmental domains (e.g .. cognitive. academic, moral. and 
social) (see Adams et al .. 1987b; Bourne. 1978a) . Overall. these 
correlates are consistent with Marcia's portrayal that identity-achieved 
individuals are strong. self-directed, and highly adaptive (Waterman. 
1992) and they confirm the broad positive findings regarding the 
achieved respondents in this study. This suggests that the use of the 
term "achieved" or "achievement" is not a n inappropriate title for 
such persons. While there is no certainty tlmt achieved persons will 
remain in this status. it does appear that while there they are likely to 
achieve both psychosocially and otherwise. 
At the other end of the continuum is diffusion . Findings from 
this study confirm Marcia's (1966) view of the diffused individuals as 
being least psychosocially adaptive. In contrast to the achieved 
respondents. psychosocial scores of diffused respondents were lower 
on every measure in the study. Marcia's characterization of diffusion of 
apathy and disinterest is related to being "unengaged" in either 
exploration or commitment (Stephen et al.. 1992). This is consistent 
with the finding of this study that diffused persons reported the 
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lowest levels of initiative and industry. Diffused persons have typically 
been found to be more worried (Adams eta!., 1985) and have greater 
levels of self-consciousness (Adams eta!., 1987a) than other statuses. 
These findings are conceptually related to the results of this study that 
diffused persons report greater levels of guilt than other statuses. 
Diffused persons have also been found to be withdrawn. least content 
with working with others, and having fewer close opposite-sex friends 
(Kroger. 1990). These characteristics are related to and supported by 
this study's finding that diffused respondents reported significantly 
lower on the trust measures and higher on the Emotional Detachment 
scale (a measure of extreme autonomy) than individuals in other 
statuses. These findings correspond to numerous studies that found 
diffused persons as being typically least advanced of the four identity 
statuses (Adams eta!., 1987b; Bourne. 1978a) . 
An area of interest regarding Marcia's theory centers on 
moratorium and foreclosed statuses. From the inception of Marcia's 
paradigm. these two statuses were viewed as intermediate between 
achievement and diffusion (Marcia, 1966) . To many. the foreclosure 
status is viewed on an adaptability continuum developmentally nearer 
diffusion. and moratorium nearer achievement (e.g., Archer. 1989; 
Marcia. 1989; Streitmatter. 1993; Waterman, 1982). Previous 
research has found that moratorium individuals score similar to 
achieved individuals in many ways. Moratoriums have been found to be 
comparable to achieved persons on measures regarding cognitive 
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ability, decision-making (Blustein & Phillips, 1990). and moral 
development (Adams et al., 1987b). However, the general findings of 
this study suggest moratorium persons may be psychosocially nearer 
diffusion than achievement. 
In a study of Cuban-Americans, Owen (1984) found that 
moratoriums scored lowest of the statuses on a general measure of 
psychosocial development. This study found that moratoriums scored 
above diffused . but lower than achieved and foreclosed respondents on 
all but two scales/subscales (scoring slightly higher than foreclosed on 
industry, and lowest on the Emotional Detachment [autonomy) 
subscale). Moratoriums have been found to (a) be least willing to be 
subordinate to group leaders (Donovan , 1975), (b) score lowest on 
measures of authoritarianism (Bennion & Adams. 1986), and (c) be 
least likely to be dependent on familiar s ettings (Kroger. 1990). This 
is consistent with this study that moratorium respondents scored 
nearer diffusion on measures of trust. autonomy, and initiative. 
An interesting paradox arises in the observation that a person 
with greater cognitive (Blustein & Phillips, 1990) and moral 
development (Adams et a!.. 1987b) can exhibit lower levels of 
psychosocial strength (Owen , 1984) . Persons in moratorium are 
presumed to be in a crisis period-which assumes an active struggle to 
make commitments (Marcia, 1966). Perhaps cognitive or moral 
development prompts one to more critically deal with seemingly 
unresolvable dilemmas during adolescence-issues which foreclosed or 
85 
diffused persons either ignore or do not recognize. Actively 
"struggling" with such issues may demand a psychosocial plice which 
foreclosed or diffused persons are unwilling or unable to pay. On the 
other hand. moratoriums may simply lack the personality and social 
resilience necessary to move forward psychosocially regardless of 
cognitive or moral quandary. It could also be that social norms reward 
commitment over exploration to such an extent that moratoriums 
suffer psychosocial "discomfort" (Marcia, 1989) . 
Studies have found foreclosed and moratortum persons to differ 
significantly on issues related to autonomy-with moratoriums typically 
scoring higher than foreclosed on measures of authoritarianism 
(Bennion & Adams. 1986). The expected finding that moratoriums 
would have greater levels of autonomy was not clearly present. 
Moratorium respondents did score significantly higher on the 
Emotional Autonomy scale. Moratorium levels on the EA Detachment 
subscale were even higher (5.57%) than those of diffused respondents. 
Because the EA scale/subscales were negatively correlated with the 
other psychosocial measures used in the study. the EA scale/subscales 
are interpreted as tapping inappropliate. unhealthy aspects of 
autonomy. Hence, it appears that foreclosed respondents. with 
significantly lower EA scores and slightly higher EPSI Autonomy 
scores. may be characteristic of greater developmentally appropriate 
autonomy. 
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PreVious findings regarding foreclosure offer a mixed View of the 
status. Typically, the personality of a foreclosed person is character-
!zed as rigid and closed-minded (Bennion & Adams, 1986). more 
dependent on others in decision-making actiVities (Blustein & 
Phillips. 1990). and often seeking the security of familiar settings 
(Kroger. 1990). Foreclosed persons are not as likely as moratorium or 
achieved persons to be analytical or philosophical (Read et al .. 1984). 
This portrayal of foreclosure prompted the expectation of lower levels 
of autonomy among foreclosed respondents in this study. Such low 
levels were not found. Indeed. foreclosed persons in this study 
reported levels on the EPSI Autonomy subscale (associated with 
healthy psychosocial development) second only to achieved (but only 
slightly higher than moratorium) respondents. Additionally. foreclosed 
persons reported the lowest levels on Emotional Autonomy scale 
(associated with inappropriate psychosocial health). 
The interpretation of the foreclosed status may be a matter of 
one's perspective . Waterman (1992) suggested that foreclosure could 
be either rigid or steadfast. dogmatic or committed. and conforming 
or cooperative. Some theorists have begun to argue that foreclosure 
may proVide a potentially beneficial harbor during stressful times (Cote 
& LeVine. l988a). Waterman (1988) stated that: 
It is . .. true that identity status theorists and researchers 
have a value preference for the "examined life" in general 
and the reflective appraisal of identity alternatives in 
specific. Yet, I think almost all would agree that there are 
both appropriate and healthy reasons for remaining 
foreclosed with respect to identity goals, values, and 
beliefs .... (p. 192) 
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Archer (1989) stated that "given the positive personality and social 
behavior correlates that have been found to be associated with the 
foreclosure status ... [foreclosure] appears to be working for that 
individual at that point in time" (p. 354). The more adaptive view of 
foreclosure is feasible based on the results of this and previous-albeit 
limited-research. In a study by Owen (1984). foreclosed individuals 
scored second only to achieved individuals on a general measure of 
psychosocial development. The same psychosocial standing was found 
of foreclosed respondents on nearly all measures used in this study-
namely, second to achievement. Marcia's (1989) assertion that when 
the "dust settled" in late adolescence, moratoriums would 
demonstrate more sophisticated adaptation than foreclosure was not 
supported in the results of this study. Until further evidence is found 
to the contrary, there appears to be limited empirical justification for 
grouping moratorium with achievement and foreclosure with diffusion, 
at least as it pertains to psychosocial development. 
To some, the issue over which of the two statuses holds the 
greatest psychosocial advantage is made somewhat immaterial with 
the rationale that both are necessary parts of an interactive identity 
formation process. Stephen et. al ( 1992) associated foreclosure and 
achievement with the commitment end of a polar continuum of that 
process. whereas moratorium and diffusion are linked with the 
exploration end. Perhaps a period of crisis (i.e., moratorium) is 
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necessary in order for a foreclosed individual to move to identity 
achievement. Theoretically. such a crisis could contribute to a 
temporary "lowering" of the levels of one's psychosocial traits. This is 
analogous to the temporary damage done to a tree when pruned, or to 
the soreness of muscles following a hard work out and which is 
concomitant to growth. In this view, neither moratorium (exploration) 
nor foreclosure (commitment) would be seen as a lower or regressive 
status, but as requisite components of "ongoing identity revision" 
(Stephen et. al. 1992). 
In addition to evidence of separate psychosocial stage 
differences between the identity statuses. psychosocial profiles 
(functions) were built for each status. Once profiles were established, 
discriminant analysis tested the accuracy of the profile by using it to 
predict membership in a status. For example. if levels of trust, 
autonomy. and initiative differ between moratorium and foreclosed 
statuses. then those differences should be useful in predicting 
whether a given respondent is either a moratorium or a foreclosed . If 
the resulting prediction level is low. then the profile is not very 
helpful in differentiating between the two groups. On the other hand, a 
high prediction accuracy indicates the profile (function) is more 
clearly capturing group differences . In this study, the prediction 
accuracies are impressive (Appendix I). 
Taken as a whole. the findings of this study indicate a 
psychosocial advantage of the achieved status, a psychosocial disparity 
of the diffused status. and an empirical separation of the foreclosed 
and moratorium statuses toward achievement and diffusion .. 
respectively. This study has served to empirically establish a 
relationship between Marcia's and Erikson's theory. The possibility 
now exists to further the development of both theories by using this 
link for relative comparisons. 
Limitations of the study 
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A number of issues pertaining to the internal and external 
validity of the results of this study need to be addressed. The quality of 
the evidence presented in the study is unavoidably influenced by 
certain limitations. Sample, design, and measurement-related issues 
are discussed. Of particular concern, content. convergent. and 
construct validities pertaining to the instrumentation are addressed. 
Limitations Due to the Sample and Design 
An initial issue pertaining to the sample is that only about 25% 
(129 of circa 500) of the persons available to participate in the survey 
were actually included in the analysis. This is due. in part, to the 
classification method used on the EOM-EIS-2 (see Jones et al., 1993). 
It Is not known how identity status and psychosocial traits differ 
among the remaining unclassified majority of the sample. It is feasible 
that their psychosocial traits can account for differences In identity 
status. It Is possible that such unclassified persons, constituting a 
majority of the sample. have psychosocial patterns which 
systematically differ from those in pure identity statuses. Therefore, 
the results of this study should not be generalized to adolescent 
populations not classifiable into a pure identity status. 
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The sample for this study was quite homogeneous, being almost 
exclusively white, single, female , college freshmen. and sophomores. 
Such a sample and cross-sectional design reflects the views of a 
narrowly selected cohort. These findings. therefore, should not be 
liberally generalized to other populations . Past and future cohorts 
would likely differ from this sample as well . 
How the same sample would score if measured at any later date 
is also not known. While foreclosure may be the norm in this society. 
theorists have posited that the preferred developmental s equence is 
the MAMA (Moratorium/ Achievement/Moratorium/ Achievement) 
cycle (Stephen et al .. 1992). It is not known whet..~er a foreclosed 
person can move into an achieved identity status without passing 
through moratorium. A one-time measurement design is not able to 
identifY either causation (i.e .. whether psychosocial development 
causes identity development or vice ver·sa) or developmental 
sequences. Therefore, findings from this study should not be used to 
infer causal direction. 
Limitations Due to Instrumentation 
Inevitably. limitations exist which relate to the validity of the 
measures used in the study. Regarding content validity, it is vital that 
the identity status measure used in this study adequately captured the 
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notions of Marcia model, and that the psychosocial measures 
adequately, but not totally. address Erikson's psychosocial domain. 
The contention that neither Marcia's paradigm of identity 
development nor the instruments developed to assess Marcia's 
paradigm fully or adequately address Erikson's notions of identity 
development is plentifully voiced (Archer & Waterman. 1990: Bosma, 
1992: Cote & Levine. 1987, 1988a. 1988b. 1989; Kroger & Haslett. 
1991). Of equal importance to this study, is the concern over the 
validity of psychosocial measures (Caillet & Michael. 1983; Gray et al ., 
1986: Logan. 1986). 
While Erikson's notion of identity development pertains to 
resolving commitments via a period of exploration. other essential 
dimensions include resolving ego versus superego dominance. 
humanistic versus technological orientation. and an appropriate value 
orientation (Cote & Levine, 1987) . Erikson wrote that this complex 
interaction involves a person's : constitutional givens, idiosyncratic 
libidinal needs, favored capacities. significant identifications. effective 
defenses, successful sublimations. and consistent roles (Erikson, 
1968). While it is unlikely that any instrument could tap such a broad 
domain. many measures, including Marcia's, have been portrayed as 
being Eriksonian-based. However. no measures exist to date-including 
those used in this study-which purport to tap all. or perhaps even 
most. of Erikson's notions on adolescent psychosocial development. 
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Constructs which have been measured, including trust. 
autonomy. initiative, guilt. industry, exploration. and commitment, 
have shown to share a moderate degree of convergent validity. It has 
been been demonstrated that the shared variability between the 
measures used in this study is just that-moderate, and not high. This 
served to assure that a broader domain would be addressed than if the 
measures were highly convergent. The limitation thereby produced is 
a relative uncertainty regarding the accuracy of each measure to tap 
the specified trait. For example. it is not known with certainty 
whether the Eriksonian notion of trust is most accurately reflected in 
the EPSI Trust Subscale (Rosenthal et al ., 1981) or in the Interper-
sonal Trust Scale (Rotter. 1967) . When the scope of a theory has yet to 
be clearly operationalized. a certain degree of construct validity is 
necessarily sacrificed in order to insure a broader- inclusion of 
applicable content (Gregory, 1992). However, the presence of theory-
consistent findings among measures-as has been found in this 
study-is an indication in itself of construct validity. 
Another limitation of the study is based on the notion of 
dialecticism or that psychosocial health is enhanced by moderation. 
Erikson has posited that extremism is psychosocially unhealthy. Yet, 
dialectic moderation is not simply choosing the middle of all positions. 
It is to do the right thing, for the right reason, at the right time. A 
perfect Eriksonian measure would not only require including all the 
psychodynamic components of his theory, but all of the 
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social/behavioral possibilities as well. Even then. creating a measure 
with the ability to determine which behavior or attitude is moderate 
from that which is extreme is likely outside the current capacity of 
pencil and paper, self-report psychometrics. This is an acceptable 
limitation to this (or any other) study as no universe of content is 
accepted as entirely adequate to define any psychological construct 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). let alone constructs as complex as 
Erikson's. In order to be an aid to intervention a measure need only 
identify psychosocial deficits/strengths. and not necessarily produce a 
complete psychosocial profile. 
The measures used in this study have addressed the scope and 
breadth of Erikson's theory on identity development in useful but 
limited ways. This does not negate the results; indeed, the measures 
have. as a group. served to establish initial relationships between two 
popular theories. 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings and the limits thereof. the following 
recommendations for future research seem warranted: 
l . Because it is not known how identity status and psychosocial 
traits differ among persons not classified into an identity status, the 
identity status measure should be modified so as to classify all 
adolescent respondents into one of the four identity statuses. 
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2. Replicative studies are needed with samples from diverse 
populations. This includes studies of adolescents who have not come 
from college. white, and middle class samples-as well as studies 
which account for differences by gender, socioeconomic status, 
religiosity. marital status, and so forth. 
3. Longitudinal studies are needed to establish the casual 
direction between psychosocial and identity development. Such 
studies could more precisely establish if. how, and when psychosocial 
traits/stages influence identity development and/or interstatus 
movement-<>r vice versa. For example, would a change in trust 
precipitate a shift in identity status? Conversely, would an increase in 
exploration lead to a change in psychosocial development? 
4. Stratified studies with persons of varying ages (childhood 
through adulthood) are needed to determine how identity issues 
become more or less relevant in different psychosocial stages-as 
posited by Erikson et al. (1986) . Such research. pertaining to several 
cohorts. could create a more valid basis to support. expand, limit. or 
otherwise modify identity theory. 
5. Modification of Eriksonian-based identity measures is needed 
in order to: (a) include a greater proportion of content related to 
Eriksonian identity theory. (b) improve the construct and convergent 
validity of Eriksonian measures. and (c) to differentiate moderate from 
extreme attitudes and behavior in a variety of settings. Such 
modifications would help to insure a balance between assessing 
psychological and contextual issues basic to Eriksonian theory. 
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The challenge of developing models to measure any aspect of 
psychosocial development can be formidable . Marcia's identity status 
paradigm has provided one of the most productive means to date for 
studying adolescent identity. This study has demonstrated that while 
not all aspects of psychosocial development have yet to be either fully 
understood and operationalized. the identity status model tends to be 
compatible with Eriksonian notions of development. 
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Extended ObJect Measure -E~o Identity Status-II 
!Bennion and Adams. 19861 
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Read each item and indicate to what degree it reflects your own 
thoughts and feelings. If a statement has more than one part, please 
indicate your reaction to the statement as a whole. Indicate your answer 
on the answer sheet by choosing one of the following responses. Do not 
write on the questionnaire itself. 
A= strongly agree 
B = moderately agree 
C =agree 
D =disagree 
E = moderately disagree 
F = strongly disagree 
1. I haven't chosen the occupation I really want to get into, and I'm just 
working at whatever is available until something better comes along. 
2. When it comes to religion I just haven't found anything that 
appeals and I don 't really feel the need to look. 
3. My ideas about men's and women 's roles are identical to my 
parents' . What has worked for them will obviously work for me. 
4 . There's no single "life style" which appeals to me more than 
another. 
5. There are a lot of different kinds of people. I'm still exploring the 
many possibilities to find the right kind of friends for me. 
6 . I sometimes join in recreational activities when asked. but I rarely 
try anything on my own. 
7. I haven't really thought about a "dating style." I'm not too 
concerned whether I date or not. 
8 . Politics is something that I can never be too sure about because 
things change so fast. But I do think it's important to know what I 
can politically stand for and believe in. 
9. I'm Still trying to decide how capable I am as a person and what 
jobs will be right for me. 
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10. I don 't give religion much thought and its doesn't bother me one 
way or the other. 
11. There's so many ways to divide responsibilities in marriage, I'm 
trying to decide what will work for me. 
12. I'm looking for an acceptable perspective for my own "life style" 
view, but haven't really found one yet. 
13. There are many reasons for friendship, but I choose my close 
friends on the basis of certain values and similarities that I've 
personally decided on. 
14. While I don 't have one recreational activity I'm really committed 
to, I'm experiencing numerous leisure outlets to identity one I 
can truly enjoy. 
15. Based on past experiences. I've chosen the type of dating 
relationship I want now. 
16. I haven't really considered politics. It just doesn't excite me 
much. 
17. I might have thought about a lot of different jobs, but there's 
never really been any question since my parents said what they 
wanted. 
18. A person's faith is unique to each individual. I've considered and 
reconsidered it myself and know what I can believe. 
19. I've never really seriously considered men's and women's roles 
in marriage. It just doesn 't seem to concern me . 
20. After considerable thought I've developed my own individual 
viewpoint of what is for me an ideal "life style" and don't believe 
anyone Will be likely to change my perspective. 
21 . My parents know what's best for me in terms of how to choose 
my friends . 
22. I've chosen one or more recreational activities to engage in 
regularly from lots of things and I'm satisfied With those choices . 
23. I don 't think about dating much. I just kind of take it as it comes. 
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24. I guess I'm pretty much like my folks when it comes to politics. I 
follow what they do in terms of voting and such. 
25. I'm really not interested in finding the right job, any job will do. 
I just seem to flow with what is available. 
26. I'm not sure what religion means to me. I'd like to make up my 
mind but I'm not done looking yet. 
27. My ideas about men's and women's roles have come light from 
my parents and family. I haven't seen any need to look further. 
28. My own views on a desirable life style were taught to me by my 
parents and I don't see any need to question what they taught 
me. 
29. I don 't have any real close fliends, and I don't think I'm looking 
for one light now. 
30. Sometimes I join in leisure activities, but I really don't see a 
need to look for a particular activity to do regularly. 
31. I'm trying out different types of dating relationships. I just 
haven't decided what is best for me. 
32. There are so many different political parties and ideals . I can't 
decide which to follow until I figure it all out. 
33. It took me a while to figure it out. but now I really know what I 
want for a career. 
34. Religion is confusing to me right now. I keep changing my views 
on what is right and wrong for me . 
35. I've spent some time thinking about men's and women's roles in 
marliage and I've decided what will work best for me. 
36. In finding an acceptable viewpoint to life itself. i find myself 
engaging in a lot of discussions with others and some self 
exploration. 
37. I only pick fliends my parents would approve of. 
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38. I've always liked doing the same recreational activities my 
parents do and haven't ever seriously considered anything else. 
39. I only go out with the type of people my parents expect me to 
date. 
40. I've thought my political beliefs through and realize I can agree 
with some and not other aspects of what my parents believe. 
41. My parents decided a long time ago what I should go into for 
employment and I'm following through their plans. 
42 . I've gone through a period of s erious questions about faith and 
can now say I understand what I believe in as an individual. 
43 . I've been thinking about the roles that husbands and wives play a 
lot these days, and I've trying to make a final decision. 
44. My parents' views on life are good enough for me, I don't need 
anything else. 
45. I've had many different friendships and now I have a clear idea of 
what I look for in a fried. 
46. After trying a lot of different recreational activities I've found one 
or more I really enjoy doing by myself or with friends . 
47. My preferences about dating are sill in the process of developing. 
I haven't fully decided yet. 
48. I'm not sure about my political beliefs. but I'm trying to figure out 
what I can truly believe in. 
49. It took me a long time to decide but now I know for sure what 
direction to move in for a career. 
50. I attend the same church as my family has always attended. I've 
never really questioned why. 
51. There are many ways that married couples can divide up family 
responsibilities. I've thought about lots of ways, and now I know 
exactly how I want it to happen. 
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52 . I guess I just kind of enjoy life in general. and I don't see myself 
living by any particular viewpoint to life. 
53. I don't have any close friends . I just like to hang around with 
the crowd. 
54. I've been experiencing a variety of recreational activities in 
hopes of finding one or more I can really enjoy for some time to 
come. 
55. I've dated different types of people and know exactly what my 
own "unwritten rules" for dating a re and who I will date . 
56. I really have never been involved in politics enough to have made 
a firm stand one way or the other. 
57. I just can't decide what to do for an occupation. There are so 
many that have possibilities. 
58. I've never really questioned my religion. If it's right for my 
parents it must be right for me. 
59. Opinions on men's and women's roles seem so varied that I don 't 
think much about it. 
60. After a lot of self-examination I have established a very defmite 
view on what my own life style will be. 
61. I really don't know what kind of friend is best for me . I'm trying 
to figure out exactly what friendship means to me . 
62 . All of my recreational preferences I got from my parents and I 
haven't really tried anything else. 
63. I date only people my parents would approve of. 
64. My folks have always had their own political and moral beliefs 
about issues like abortion and mercy killing and I've always gone 
along accepting what they have . 
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Question domains 
Achievement: 8. 13, 15, 18, 20. 22. 33. 35, 40, 42, 45, 46, 49, 51 , 
55, 60. 
Moratorium: 5. 9, 11, 12. 14, 26, 31, 32, 34, 36, 43, 47, 48, 54, 57, 
61. 
Foreclosure: 3, 17, 21. 24, 27. 28. 37, 38, 39. 41, 44. 50, 58. 62, 
63, 64. 
Diffusion: 1. 2. 4 , 6, 7, 10, 16. 19, 23, 25, 29, 30, 52, 53, 56, 59. 
Appendix B 
Eiiksonian Psychosocial Stage Inventory 
(Rosenthal et al .. 1981) 
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Eriksonian Psychosocial Stag-e Inventory (Rosenthal eta!. 198ll 
This opinion survey has no correct or incorrect answers . Answer the 
following questions by writing the appropriate number on the score 
sheet. Do not write on this questionnaire: 
A = strongly agree 
B = moderately agree 
C =agree 
D =disagree 
E = moderately disagree 
F = strongly disagree 
l. I am able to take things as they come. 
2 . I can't make sense of my life . 
3. I wish I had more self control. 
4. I get embarrassed when someone begins to tell me personal things. 
5. I can't make up my own mind about things. 
6 . I change my opinion of myself a Jot. 
7 . I am able to be first with new ideas. 
8. I'm never going to get on in this world . 
9. I'm ready to get involved with a special person. 
10. I've got a clear idea of what I want to be. 
11 . I feel mixed up. 
12. I find the world a very confusing place. 
13. I know when to please myself and when to please others. 
14. The important things in life are clear to me. 
15. I don't seem to be able to achieve my ambitions. 
16. I don 't seem to have the ability that most others have got. 
17. I've got it all together. 
18. I know what kind of person I am. 
19. I worry about losing control of my feelings. 
20. I have few doubts about myself. 
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21. I rely on other people to give me ideas. 
22. I don't enjoy working. 
23. I think I must be basically bad. 
24. Other people understand me. 
25. I'm a hard worker. 
26. I feel guilty about many things. 
27. I'm warm and friendly. 
28 . I really believe in myself. 
29. I cant' decide what I want to do with my life . 
30. It's important to me to be completely open with my friends . 
31. I find that good things never last long. 
32. I feel I am a useful person to have around . 
33. I keep what I really think and feel to myself. 
34. I'm an energetic person who does lots of things. 
35. I'm trying hard to achieve my goals. 
36. Things and people usually tum out well for me. 
37. I have a strong sense of what it means to be female/male. 
38. I think the world and people in it are basically good . 
39. I am ashamed of myself. 
40. I'm good at my work . 
41. I think its' crazy to get too involved with people. 
42. People are out to get me. 
43. I like myself and am proud of what I stand for. 
44. I don 't really know what I'm all about. 
45. I can 't stand lazy people. 
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46. I can stop myself from things I shouldn't be doing. 
47. I find myself expecting the worst to happen. 
48. I care deeply for others. 
49. I find I have to keep up a front when I'm with people. 
50. I find myself denying things even though they are true. 
51. I don 't really feel involved . 
52. I waste a lot of my time messing about. 
53. I'm as good as other people. 
54. I like to make my own choices. 
55. I don't feel confident of my judgment. 
56. I'm basically a loner. 
57. I cope very well . 
58. I'm not much good at things that need brains or skill. 
59. I have a close physical and emotional relationship with another 
person. 
60. l stick with things until they're finished . 
61. I'm a follower rather than a leader . 
62. I can stand on my own two feet . 
63. I find it hard to make up my mind . 
64. I trust people. 
65. I like my freedom and don't want to be tied down. 
66. I like new adventures. 
67. I prefer not to show too much of myself to others. 
68. I don't get things finished. 
69. I like finding out about new things or places. 
70. I don 't get much done . 
71. Being alone with other people makes me feel uncomfortable. 
72. I find it easy to make close friends. 
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Question domain 
Trust: ;i. 12.. .ill. 20, 24, ;u, 36, 38, 42, 47, 53, 64. 
Autonomy: 1, 2_, 
.2. ~. 13, 28, 39, 54, 55, 62, 63, 65. 
Initiative: 7, .lQ, ll. 23, 26, 34, 46, 50, 57, Q.l, 66, 69. 
Industry: 1.5.. 22, 25, 32, 35, 40, 45, 52, 58, 60, Qli, I.Q. 
Identity: Q, 10, ll. 14, 17, 18. 29, 37, 43, 44, .1.9.. Q.l. 
Intimacy: i. 9. 27, 30, 33, i.L 48, 56, 59, 67, 11.. 72. 
Reverse underlined scores. 
Appendix C 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
(Rotter. 1966) 
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lnternersonal Trust Scale 
(Rotter. 1966) 
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. (R) 
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2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they 
have provided evidence that they are trustworthy. (R) 
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people 
into politics. (R) 
4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience 
prevents most people from breaking the law. (R) 
5. Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during 
exams would probably result in increased cheating. (R) 
6. Parents usually can be rehed on to keep their promises. 
7. The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world 
peace. (R) 
8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. 
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that 
the public hears and sees is distorted. (R) 
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most people 
are primarily interested in their own welfare. 
11. Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio. and T.V., it is 
hard to get objective accounts of public events. (R) 
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12. The future seems very promising. 
13. If we really knew what was going on in international politics. the 
public would have reason to be more frightened than they now 
seem to be. (R) 
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign 
promises . 
15. Many major national sports contests are ftxed in one way or 
another. (R) 
16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits 
of their knowledge. 
17. Most parens can be relied upon to carry out their threats of 
punishments. 
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is 
likely to take advantage of you. (R) 
20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
22. Most students in school would not cheat even if they were sure of 
getting away with it. 
23. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are 
ignorant of their specialty. 
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24. A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies 
are phony. (R) 
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
Reverse scores on items: 1, 2, 3 , 4. 5 , 7, 9, 11. 13, 15, 19, 24. 
Appendix D 
Emotional Autonomy Scale 
(Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986) 
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Emotional Autonomy Scale 
!Steinberg & Silverberg. 1986) 
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Indicate on the score sheet the degree to which you agree or disagree 
with each statement by using the following scale: 
A= strongly agree 
B = moderately agree 
C =agree 
D =disagree 
E = moderately disagree 
F = strongly disagree 
1. My parents and I agree on everything. (R) 
2. l go to my parents for help before trying to solve a problem myself. 
(R) 
3. I have often wondered how my parents act when I'm no around. 
4. Even when my parents and I disagree. my parents are always 
right. (R) 
5. It's better for kids to go to their best friend than to their parents 
for advice on some things . 
6 . When I've done something wrong, I depend on my parents to 
straighten things out for me. (R) 
7. There are some things about me that my parents don't know. 
8. My parents act differently when they are with their own parents 
from the way the do home. 
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9 . My parents know everything there is to know about me. (R) 
10. I might be surprised to see how my parents act at a party. 
11 . I try to have the same opinions as my parents. (R) 
12. When they are at work. my parents act pretty much the same way 
they do when they are at home. (R) 
13. If I was having a problem with one of my friends. I would discuss 
it with my mother or father before deciding what to do about it. 
(R) 
14. My parents would be surprised to know what I'm like when I'm 
not with them. 
15. When I become a parent. I'm going to treat my children in exactly 
the same way that my parents have treated me. (R) 
16. My parents probably talk about different things when I am around 
from what they talk about when I'm not. 
17. There are things that I will do differently from my mother and 
father when I become a parent. 
18. My parents hardly ever make mistakes. (R) 
19. I wish my parents would understand who I really am. 
20. My parents act pretty much the same way when they are with 
their friends as they do when they are at home with me. (R) 
Note: (R) denotes items to be reversed in scoring. 
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Initiative/Guilt Subscales of the Ego Stage Development Inventory 
(Caillet. 1980) 
Appendix E-1 
Initiative/Guilt Subscales of the Ego Stage 
Development Inventory (Caillet 1980! 
Initiative items: 
1. I make it a point to meet people who interest me. 
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2. When it come to social and public programs, I am an initiator of 
action. 
3. As a child, I hand an active imagination. 
4. Even as a child. I was working toward some goal or object. 
5 . l am inventive, an idea person . 
6. When doing things With my close friends, I am the one who thinks 
of the ideas and makes the plans. 
7. In reference to the clubs and organizations I belong to, I 
participate in and take responsibility for the planning of goals and 
objectives. 
8. I organize physical activities and other outdoor events for my 
friends and myself. 
9. When young, I came up With good ideas for projects With family 
and friends. 
10. I plan and follow a program of physical activity and diet in order to 
meet my specified exercise and weight goals. 
11. I enjoy planning social activities. 
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12. I trust my close friends. 
Guilt items: [all reverse scored (R)] 
13. When in large groups. I tend to let others make the plans and 
arrangements. (R) 
14. I let others initiate physical activities. (R) 
15. I find myself lowering my goals and expectations rather than 
fighting for them. (R) 
16. I like others to tell me what to do. (R) 
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17. I feel defeated in my efforts to establish goals and make plans in 
my work and/ school settings. (R) 
18. I feel guilty about my lack of motivation to participate in physical 
activities and exercise. (R) 
19. I feel guilty about my fantasies and actions . (R) 
20. I tend to be inhibited and self-restricted in social situations. (R) 
21. Decisions are difficult for me. (R) 
22. I feel guilty about my behavior toward others. (R) 
23. While growing up. my parents made me feel guilty about my 
actions. (R) 
24. I was a shy child. (R) 
Appendix F 
Self-Efficacy Scale 
(Sherer et a!. , 1982) 
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Self-Efficacy Scale (Sherer et a!.. 1982 
1. When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work. 
2. One of my problems is that I cannot get down to work when I 
should. (R) 
3. If I can't do a job the first time. I keep trying until I can. 
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4. When I set important goals for myself. I rarely achieve them. (R) 
5. I give up on things before completing them. (R) 
6. I avoid facing difficulties . (R) 
7 . If something looks too complicated. I will not ever bother to try it. 
(R) 
8. When I have something unpleasant to do, I stick to it until I finish 
it. 
9. When I decide to do something. I go right to work on it. 
10. When trying to learn something new, I soon give up if I am not 
initially successful. (R) 
11. When unexpected problems occur, I don 't handle them well. (R) 
12. I avoid trying to learn new things when they look too difficult for 
me. (R) 
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13. Failure just makes me try harder. 
14. I feel insecure about my ability to do things. (R) 
15. I am a self-reliant person. 
16. I give up easily. (R) 
17. I do not seem capable of dealing with most problems that come up 
in life. (R) 
18. It is difficult for me to make new friends. (R) 
19. If I see someone I would like to meet. I go to that person instead 
of waiting for him or her to come to me. 
20. If I meet someone interesting who is hard to make friends with. 
I'll soon stop trying to make friends with that person. (R) 
21. When I'm trying to become friends with someone who seems 
uninterested at first , I don 't give up easily. 
22. l don not handle myself well in social gatherings. (R) 
23. I have acquired my friends through my personal abilities at 
making friends. 
Note: (R) denotes items to be reversed in scoring. 
Appendix G 
Summary of Factor Analysis Emotional Autonomy Scale 
and EPSI Autonomy Subscale 
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Factor Analysis Summary of Emotional Autonomy Scale 
and EPSI Autonomy Subscale 
Vs;!,ri!;!Ql!: Communality Factor Ei!i(en Value Pet. ofVar. 
EPS01 .39 1 5.32 16.6 
EPS02 .33 2 3.94 12.3 
EPS04 .48 3 2.13 6.6 
Fs;!.ctor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1.000 
Factor 2 .204 1.000 
Factor 3 -.232 .036 1.000 
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~urn. P!;t. 
16.6 
28.9 
35.6 
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Autonomy Measures Factor Analysis Structure Martix 
v AIJflQ L 
11 Alir14 
") AlJf03 
£.c.AUr20 
~~ Alir19 
'I AUIU8 
/L, Alir16 
I Z...AUr12 
7 AliT07 -
i I Alirl1 
I AUID1 
~ AlJID4 
\ ) AlJrl3 
)'., AlJrl5 
"LAUID2 
i~= 
tl Alirl7 
\; AUT06 
Factor 1 tttled · Detachment 
.68 V 
.67V 
.64 V 
.63 V 
.62 t/ 
.59 V 
.53 t/ 
.45 V 
.42 
Fact or 2 Tit led· ]ndeoendence 
.72 
.68 
.68 
.59 
.59 
.59 
.56 
.55 
.42 
.42 
FACfOR 3: EPSI Autonomy 
.68 
.63 
.62 
.61 
.60 
.60 
.57 
.56 
.55 
.50 
.41 
Note: PAF Extraction. Oblique Rotation. Blank [< .4) . 
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Status Group Means by Rank 
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Status Group Means by Rank 
EPS!Trust. E~!AutQ!1 EPS! lnitl. EPS!Ingu~. 
Achleved 53.58 I 5.8 54.91 I 6.5 56.47 I 5.4 57.33 I 6.6 
Foreclosed 49.67 I 7.8 50.33 I 7.8 53.11 I 5.8 54.31 I 7.4 
Moratorium 45.86 I 6.5 49.58 I 82 51.15 I 8.0 52.54 I 7.7 
Dllfused 45.67 I 6.6 45.38 I 7.9 48.041 6.9 51.29 I 7.2 
Th.zst lnlll<!!lv~ Low Guilt 
Achleved 80.51 I 9.9 53.98 I 6.7 52.14 I 8.3 
Foreclosed 79.561 10.5 50.31 I 82 48.92 I 7.5 
Moratorium 75.38 I 11.0 49.88 I 6.9 45.12 I 7.6 
Diffused 74.63 I 10.5 41.88 I 7.1 44.63 I 8.4 
l!:!:l!mY 
Achleved 103.37 I 11.1 
Moratorium 96.35 I 13.3 
Foreclosed 95.86 I 16.0 
Dllfused 87.46 I 15.2 
Detachment• Autonon1y• lnQ~Jl~nd~n£e" 
Achleved 31.88 I 7.9 Foreclosed 68.31 I 7.9 Foreclosed 38.83 I 5.5 
Foreclosed 33.97 I 5.7 Achleved 71.23 I 12.0 Moratorium 43.50 I 7.6 
Diffused 36.461 5.9 Moratorium 77.19 I 12.2 Achieved 43.72 I 6.6 
Moratorium 38.58 I 7 .4 Diffused 77.25 I 9.8 Diffused 45.25 I 7.5 
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Appendix 1- 1 
Discriminant Analysis Classification Results 
Actual 
QrQ.1m 
Achieved 43 
Moratorium 26 
Actual 
.Q.rQ.\m 
Achieved 43 
Foreclosed 36 
Actual 
Group 
Achieved 43 
Diffused 24 
Achieved with Moratorium 
Predicted 
Achieved 
33 (76.7%) 
1 (3.8%) 
10 (23.3%) 
Predicted 
Moratorium 
25 (96.2%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 84.06% 
Achieved with Foreclosed 
Predicted Predicted 
Achieved Foreclosed 
28 (65.1 %) 15 (34.9%) 
12 (33.3%) 24 (66. 7%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 65 .82% 
Achieved with Diffused 
Predicted Predicted 
Achieved Dlffuseg 
38 (88.4%) 5 (11.6%) 
1 (4.2%) 23 (95.8%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 91.04% 
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Moratorium with Foreclosed 
Moratorium 
Foreclosed 
Moratorium 
Diffused 
Foreclosed 
Diffused 
Actual 
Group 
26 
36 
Actual 
Group 
26 
24 
Actual 
Group 
36 
24 
Predicted 
Achieved 
17 (65.4%) 
8 (22.2%) 
Predicted 
Foreclosed 
9 (34.6%) 
28 (77.8%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 72.58% 
Moratorium with Diffused 
Predicted 
Moratorium 
20 (76.9%) 
6 (25.0%) 
Predicted 
Diffused 
6 (23.1%) 
18 (75 .0%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 76.00% 
Foreclosed with Diffused 
Predicted 
Foreclosed 
28 (77.8%) 
4 (16.7%) 
Predicted 
Diffused 
8 (22.2%) 
20 (83 .3%) 
Percent of total correctly classified: 80.00% 
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